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ABSTRACT
The central feature of patent law in the chemical, biotechnology,
and pharmaceutical industries is the genus claim — a patent claim that
covers not just one specific chemical but a group of related chemicals.
Genus claims are everywhere, and any patent lawyer will tell you they
are critical to effective patent protection.
But as we show in this Article, the law has changed dramatically
in the last thirty years, to the point where it is nearly impossible to
maintain a valid genus claim. Courts almost always hold them invalid,
either at trial or on appeal. Remarkably, courts do this without acknowledging that they’ve fundamentally changed an important area of law.
More remarkably, it’s not clear that patent lawyers and patent owners
have noticed this shift. Invention, investment, patenting, and patent litigation continue much as they have before, but the genus patents that
are thought to be the basis of this activity generally end up invalid.
We document this surprising shift in the law. We explain why we
think it represents both bad law and bad policy. We also discuss why it
hasn’t seemed to matter to the relevant stakeholders, and what that fact
says about the relevance of patent doctrine more generally.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The most fundamental rule of patent law is that what the patentee
owns is defined not by what she actually built or described, but by the
patent claim — the legal definition of the invention drafted by her patent lawyer. Lawyers draft those claims as broadly as the law appears
to allow. In particular, lawyers are careful not to limit the claim to a
particular thing or “species,” even though that’s normally what the patentee actually built or conceived. Instead, patent lawyers lead with a
“genus claim” — a broad claim that covers a group of structurally related products that incorporate the basic advance of the patented invention. 1 They do this to make sure that no one can copy their basic idea
by making a small change to it to avoid infringing the patent.
Nowhere is this more true than in the chemical arts. 2 Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and chemical companies rely more heavily on the
patent system than do other industries. 3 Some scholars have concluded
that the system works well in those industries but not others. 4 And those
industries make heavy use of genus claims. A chemical patent, for instance, might include one or more claims to a particular compound —
a species — but almost invariably it starts with a claim to a group of
chemicals — the genus. It bears emphasizing that these genus claims
are thought important to prevent competitors from capturing the benefit
of an invention while avoiding infringement by making a minor change
to one aspect of it. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
grants broad genus claims as a matter of course in the chemical industries. 5 And those industries regularly attempt to enforce such claims in
court. 6
1. See In re Kalm, 378 F.2d 959, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“When one speaks of a ‘genus’ in
the chemical arts, one ordinarily speaks of a group of compounds closely related both in structure and properties.”). The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) was a fivejudge Article III appellate court on the same level as the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the CCPA. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 122, 96
Stat. 25, 36 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its
creation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit adopted CCPA decisional law as
binding precedent. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
2. In this Article, we sometimes use the terms “chemical,” “pharmaceutical,” and “biotechnological” somewhat interchangeably to refer to industries focused on the development and
use of new molecules and compounds. We view the term “chemical” as encompassing both
biotechnology as well as more traditional organic and inorganic chemistry. Our Article is
focused on those fields, and our argument does not extend to non-chemical industries. At
various points, we do distinguish rules that apply differently to certain subfields, such as specialized rules for certain biotechnological inventions. We make clear when we are doing so.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See Sean B. Seymore, Patenting the Unexplained, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 729 (2019)
(noting that genus claims are “ubiquitous” in these industries).
6. See infra Part III.
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When they do, however, something surprising happens. As we
show in this Article, courts almost invariably hold genus claims invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) for failure to enable or describe the full scope
of the claimed invention. In the last thirty years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the court with exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals) has struck down claim after claim on the theory that
whatever the patentee has done to justify a broad claim to a group of
chemicals, it isn’t enough. It regularly reverses district courts that have
found adequate support for the genus claim. 7 Not once but three times
has the Federal Circuit thrown out a jury verdict of over a billion dollars
because it concluded the genus claims at issue were invalid. 8 In fact,
we find only a small minority of Federal Circuit decisions that have
upheld a genus claim in the chemical industry in the past thirty years,
and each of those has some idiosyncrasy that explains why it bucks the
trend. 9 That trend, as reflected in dozens of cases, is unmistakable: biotechnology, chemical, and pharmaceutical genus claims lose in court.
It’s unclear whether patent lawyers and scholars have discovered
this shift in the jurisprudence. Patent lawyers continue to draft genus
claims, the USPTO grants them, and patent owners attempt to enforce
them in court. Lawyers and scholars sometimes lament individual decisions they disagree with. But the whole system seems to proceed merrily along on the assumption that the role of genus claims in supporting
these industries is secure. It isn’t.
We argue that the death of genus claims is the result of some subtle
but important doctrinal shifts, and that those changes reflect a misunderstanding of the purposes that patent law is supposed to serve. The
Federal Circuit has abandoned a practical focus on whether others
could make and use the claimed invention, instead favoring a fruitless
search for the exact boundaries of that invention. This “full-scope possession” theory invalidates a genus claim unless the patentee can show
exactly which species within the genus will work as intended — an impossible task for a genus of any nontrivial size. 10 Given the importance
of patents to the biotechnology, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries, and the importance of genus claims to those patents, we find the
death of genus claims in modern courts troubling. If the doctrine continues down this path, it may threaten innovation in an important sector
of the economy.

7. See infra Part III.
8. See Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2021);
Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 696 (D. Del. 2017) (considering
motion to enhance the jury’s $2.54 billion damages award), patent invalidated by 941 F.3d
1149, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 636 F.3d 1341,
1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9. See infra Section III.C.
10. See infra Section III.C.
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We think the law should go back to the way it was: Genus claims
should survive as long as they enable other researchers to make effective use of the teachings of the patent to make and use chemicals within
the genus without too much experimentation. 11 As a doctrinal matter,
the validity of a claim should not depend on whether others can identify
and test all of the species, and as a matter of policy, genus claims are
important to innovation in these industries.
But the importance of our discovery isn’t limited to getting patent
policy right. The death of genus claims is also an important lesson in
how the law on the ground differs from the law on the books. The fact
that the industry proceeds apace — investing in innovation, obtaining
and enforcing patents, despite this surprising turn in the case law —
suggests that we may know less than we think we do about whether and
how the patent system supports chemical innovation.
In Part II, we introduce the role of genus claims in chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology patents and outline the traditional applications of § 112(a)’s requirements of enablement and written
description to these claims. In Part III, we discuss the validity of genus
claims, documenting the striking trend to invalidate those claims in the
past thirty years and the subtle doctrinal shifts that led to it. Finally, in
Part IV, we further examine this trend and discuss its implications for
innovation in those industries — and what it says about the importance
of patent doctrine more generally.

II. GENUS CLAIMING: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
A. Understanding Patent Claims
Claims are central to every aspect of patent law. 12 Claims are the
numbered sentences at the end of the patent document that define the
“technological territory” that the patentee claims is his or hers to
11. The approach we propose appears to have been adopted in a recent decision by the
Court of Appeal, the highest court within the Senior Courts of England and Wales: “[I]t is not
necessary as a matter of law, for sufficiency . . . , simply because the claim contains functional
features (or a mix of functional and structural features) to establish that the skilled person can
identify all or substantially all the compounds which satisfy the test . . . . For claims of this
type, it must be possible for the skilled person, without undue burden, to identify some compounds beyond those named in the patent, which are within the claimed class and therefore
are likely to have therapeutic efficacy.” FibroGen Inc. v. Akebia Therapeutics Inc., [2021]
EWCA (Civ) 1279 [95], [97] (Eng.).
12. Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV.
101, 101 (2005); see also Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of
Claims — American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499
(1990) (stating that in patent law, “the name of the game is the claim”). At the application
stage, the inventor “dicker[s] with the [USPTO] to obtain an expansive exclusory right; and
in litigation the parties try to convince the court to construe the claims in their favor.” Sean
B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 128–
29 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Enablement].
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control, 13 and thus set the scope of the exclusory right conferred by the
patent. 14 The kinds of patent claims one encounters track the language
of 35 U.S.C. § 101, which sets forth “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” as patentable subject
matter. 15 At a high level, claims can refer to a structure, such as a chair
or a chemical compound, or an activity, such as a process for manufacturing the table or a method of treating an illness with the compound.
In the chemical and biochemical sciences, genus claims capture a group
of related molecular structures. 16 While chemical genus claims are often composition (i.e., structure) claims, many claims we will encounter
in this Article are actually method claims directed to an effective treatment of some condition or to other uses of the molecules belonging to
a chemical genus. 17
1. Claim Scope and the Disclosure Function of Patents
The permissible scope of patent claims, and the exclusive rights
they confer, are closely tied to the amount of information that the patentee discloses in the patent. Put simply, the patentee must give more
(information about the invention through disclosure) to get more (claim
scope). 18 This give and take lies at the heart of the U.S. patent system,
which is essentially a bargain or quid pro quo between the patentee and
society. 19 The patentee gets the limited period of exclusivity conferred
by the patent, as set forth in the claims, so that they might recoup their
13. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990).
14. See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).
16. See In re Kalm, 378 F.2d 959, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“When one speaks of a ‘genus’ in
the chemical arts, one ordinarily speaks of a group of compounds closely related both in structure and properties.”).
17. See generally Sean B. Seymore, Patenting New Uses for Old Inventions, 73 VAND. L.
REV. 479 (2020) (discussing method of use patents).
18. The noted patent lawyer and judge Giles Sutherland Rich captured the tradeoffs involving claim scope: “The stronger a patent the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the stronger
it is. To explain, a patent that is strong in that it contains broad claims which adequately
protect the invention so they are hard to design around is weak in that it may be easier to
invalidate and is therefore less likely to stand up in court because the claims are more likely
to read on prior art or be broader than the disclosed invention . . . . On the other hand, the
patent with narrow claims of the kind the Patent Office readily allows quickly without a contest is weak as protection and as incentive to invest but strong in that a court will not likely
invalidate it.” Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967).
19. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents
a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new
and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period
of time.”).
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investment in invention. In exchange, society gets two things: (1) use
of the invention once the patent term expires, 20 and (2) the disclosure,
which furnishes technical information about the invention (i.e., how to
make and use it) as soon as the patent document publishes. 21 The disclosure “add[s] to the sum of useful knowledge” 22 and becomes a part
of the technical literature. 23 Patent theory posits that the disclosure will
stimulate other researchers to improve upon the invention, design
around it, and make wholly new inventions — all during the patent
term — and also to use the invention as claimed after the patent’s expiration. 24 Indeed, an oft-touted justification for the patent system is
that society will get some benefit from the invention’s disclosure. 25
2. Enablement and the Sufficiency of Disclosure
The bargain inherent to patent law only works if the patent’s specification, the descriptive part of the patent document, 26 provides
20. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) (“The object is to put the public in
complete possession of the invention . . . so that interference with it may be avoided while the
patent continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the patent expires.”).
21. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights,
61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 333 (2008) (“[I]t seems quite clear that dissemination, not just invention, of new information is one of the goals of the patent system.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 552–71 (2012) (exploring the technical value of patent disclosures). Patent documents include issued patents
and published patent applications. Since 1999, most patent applications publish eighteen
months after the earliest effective filing date. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2018). Once a
patent application publishes, the information it discloses is considered publicly known. See
id. § 102.
22. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974); cf. In re Argoudelis,
434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting that the full disclosure
of how to make and use the invention “adds a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public
storehouse”).
23. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 400 (1960).
Like technical journals, for example, patent disclosures can show the state of technology, set
forth what others have already achieved, and provide technical information that others can
avoid repeating. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 621, 623–24 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function].
24. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481; see also Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 264 (1994). Of course, others could use the
patented invention during the term of the patent, too, under a license from the patentee.
25. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481 (explaining that we are “willing to pay the high
price” of exclusivity conferred by a patent for its disclosure, which, “it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the art”). How
effective those disclosures are in practice is a matter of dispute. Compare Ouellette, supra
note 21, at 552–53, with Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV.
709, 711, 747–48 (2012). But there is general agreement that the disclosure function works
best in the chemical arts, where scientists have a shared language and the scope of patents is
relatively clear. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 14, 18 (2008).
26. Courts, scholars, practitioners, and the USPTO use the term “specification” to refer to
the written description — the part of the patent document that provides descriptive details
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sufficient technical information about the invention to enrich the public
storehouse of knowledge. Section 112(a) of the Patent Act strives to
achieve this aim by mandating that the patent “shall contain a written
description of the invention . . . as to enable any person skilled in the
art [“PHOSITA”] 27 . . . to make and use the same . . . .” 28 As interpreted by courts, the enablement requirement created by this language
compels a patentee to furnish a disclosure sufficient to teach the
PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation. 29
Enablement issues can arise in patent prosecution 30 or litigation. 31
In both contexts, “an enablement determination is made retrospectively, i.e., by looking back to the filing date of the patent application
and determining whether undue experimentation would have been required to make and use the claimed invention at that time . . . .” 32 The
Federal Circuit set forth the relevant factors in In re Wands. 33 They are:
(1) the amount of direction or guidance presented in the disclosure,
(2) the existence of working examples, (3) the nature of the invention,
(4) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, (5) the PHOSITA’s
level of skill, (6) the state of the prior art (preexisting knowledge and

about the invention (e.g., “Background of the Invention,” “Summary of the Invention,” “Detailed Description of the Invention,” and “Drawings”). CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF
PATENTS 47 (5th ed. 2020). This is done, in part, to avoid confusion with the “written description” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See infra Section II.C.1.
27. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably prudent
person in negligence law. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the sophistication of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the educational level of active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the art, prior
art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which innovations are made. Env’t Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
We use PHOSITA, not POSA, as one opinion recently declared it to be. Idenix Pharms.
LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2019); cf. Joseph P. Meara, Note,
Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002) (using the established term, PHOSITA).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018). Note that prior to 2012, the relevant provision was codified
as § 112, first paragraph, rather than in § 112(a).
29. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent,
Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
30. The process of obtaining a patent — where the inventor or his or her agent or attorney
files an application with the USPTO — is called “patent prosecution.” JANICE M. MUELLER,
PATENT LAW 59 (5th ed. 2016). In prosecution, the examiner must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the challenged claim is not enabled. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing the examiner’s burden of production and persuasion).
31. An issued patent is presumed valid in litigation; therefore, a challenger has the burden
of proving that a claim is invalid for a lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence.
See Alcon Rsch. Ltd. v. Barr Lab’ys, Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
32. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing
Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
33. 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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technology already available to the public), 34 (7) the breadth of the
claims, and (8) the amount of experimentation necessary to practice the
claimed invention. 35
The Wands factors show that the nature of the underlying technology affects how much a patent’s specification must teach to enable a
patent claim. Historically, there has been a natural dichotomy in enablement jurisprudence: courts appeared to apply separate enablement
standards for inventions in the predictable and unpredictable arts. 36 In
the predictable arts, which include mechanical and electrical engineering, a detailed disclosure has not been required because the inventions
are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors. 37 If a claim requires a
“fastener,” for instance, skilled artisans may well understand that a variety of different fasteners will work (nails, staples, glue, etc.) even if
the patent itself doesn’t specify any particular embodiment of a fastener. By contrast, in the unpredictable arts, which include experimental fields like chemistry, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology, a
detailed disclosure is required because PHOSITAs often cannot anticipate whether a process that works for one embodiment (or species) of
an invention 38 will work for others. 39 For example, in chemistry, the
PHOSITA often cannot take a result from one reaction and predict how
similar compounds will behave with a reasonable expectation of

34. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). Documents (i.e., issued patents and
printed publications), devices, and activities are sources of prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2018).
35. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
36. For a deeper discussion of the predictable-unpredictable dichotomy, see Seymore,
Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 136–39; Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 282–84 (2008).
37. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite level of
disclosure for an invention involving predictable mechanical or electrical elements is less than
that required for the unpredictable arts).
38. An “embodiment” is a concrete, physical form of an invention described in a patent
application or patent. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY 33 (7th ed. 2017).
39. Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., 121 F.3d 727, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (unpublished table disposition); see also In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (noting “the high level of predictability in mechanical or electrical environments and
the lower level of predictability expected in chemical reactions and physiological activity”).
Courts have long recognized the differences between something like a simple mechanical
device and a chemical compound. See, e.g., Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1868)
(“Now a machine which consists of a combination of devices is the subject of invention, and
its effects may be calculated a priori, while a discovery of a new substance by means of
chemical combinations of known materials is empirical and discovered by experiment.”);
Naylor v. Alsop Process Co., 168 F. 911, 919 (8th Cir. 1909) (“It should also be borne in
mind in considering this subject that reasoning by analogy in a complex field like chemistry
is very much more restricted than in a simple field like mechanics.”).
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success. 40 The standard for enablement is thus effectively industry-specific. 41 Nevertheless, even in a less predictable field like chemistry, inventors routinely obtained and successfully enforced patent claims
covering a group of structurally related chemicals (i.e., genus claims)
prior to the 1990s. 42
3. Enablement’s Commensurability Requirement
A perennial enablement question is what breadth and depth of disclosure is sufficient to entitle a patentee to a broad genus claim that
covers various ways of implementing the invention. The short but unhelpful answer is that the information disclosed must be “commensurate” with the scope of the invention. 43 The basic premise and practical
advantage of genus claims is that a detailed teaching involving one species can provide sufficient enablement for extrapolation across the entire scope of the claimed genus. 44 When it does, the patentee can satisfy
enablement’s commensurability requirement without demonstrating
that each and every embodiment of a genus claim works for the intended purpose. 45 Claiming a genus thus allows the patentee to obtain
rights to numerous structurally related species in the genus, including
some that the patentee herself never thought of.
How can a patent claim cover something the patentee never thought
of? Because a claimed invention may likely encompass many embodiments, courts have permitted the PHOSITA to engage in “a ‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation” 46 to distinguish the
embodiments that work from those that don’t. 47 The U.S. Court of
40. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 144–46 (emphasizing that, in
chemistry, the “array of chemical compounds which are structurally similar may differ radically in their properties”); cf. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (testing
enablement by determining if a skilled scientist working with RNA viruses would have reasonably believed that the inventor’s success with the described embodiment(s) “could be extrapolated with a reasonable expectation of success” to other embodiments encompassed by
the claims).
41. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific].
42. See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.
43. See Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
44. Wright, 999 F.2d at 1564.
45. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (explaining that “the word ‘invention’ in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor’s conception rather than to a
physical embodiment of that idea”); Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“The mere fact that something has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting all applications purporting to disclose how to do it.” (quoting In re
Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956))).
46. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
47. Id. (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (“We have held that a
patent specification complies with the statute even if a ‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation
must not be ‘undue.’”).
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Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) 48 recognized that the alternative of requiring the patentee to identify and test every possible species
in a genus would be unworkable: “[T]he research to do this would quite
evidently be endless.” 49 This is known as the inoperative embodiments
doctrine — a broad claim that covers unknown species is not necessarily invalid as long as enough of the subject matter works as described. 50 Validity depends on the circumstances of each case —
including the nature of the subject matter (whether predictable or unpredictable), 51 the PHOSITA’s level of skill, 52 and the number of inoperative embodiments. 53
But how are we to know when the patentee has taught enough to
justify a claim to an entire genus? The Supreme Court faced this issue
long ago in the famous Incandescent Lamp case. 54 The patent in suit
claimed a light bulb with a filament made of “carbonized fibrous or
textile material.” 55 While this broad claim covered every “carbonized
fibrous or textile material” used as a filament, the specification only
disclosed light bulbs using carbonized paper and wood carbon. 56
Thomas Edison, the accused infringer, found through laborious trial
and error that bamboo worked well as a filament for incandescent light
bulbs, but over six thousand other substances covered by the genus
claim did not. 57 The Supreme Court held that the patentee was entitled

48. This court was one of the predecessors to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which adopted its decisions as binding precedent. See supra note 1.
49. In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1964); see also RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT
CLAIMS § 214, at 275 (1949) (recognizing that in theory the only way that a chemist can
determine if all species within a claimed genus will work as described is by testing “at least a
majority of the members of that genus”).
50. See In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971); Sarett, 327 F.2d at 1019 (noting
that the mere inclusion of inoperative embodiments within the scope of a claim will not defeat
patentability).
51. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Cook, 439 F.2d at 735 (noting that a broad claim that reads on a large number
of inoperative embodiments is not necessarily invalid because the PHOSITA could figure out
with minimal effort which of the unmade embodiments could work as intended). Recall that
the PHOSITA’s level of skill is a Wands factor. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
53. See, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (Incandescent Lamp), 159
U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (determining that the claim was invalid because most of the claimed
embodiments were inoperable); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750
F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[I]f the number of inoperative [embodiments] becomes
significant, and in effect forces [the PHOSITA] to experiment unduly in order to practice the
claimed invention, the claims might indeed be invalid.”); Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc.,
256 F.3d 1298, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (determining that a showing that a “significant percentage” of embodiments encompassed by the claims is inoperable might be sufficient to
prove invalidity).
54. Incandescent Lamp, 159 U.S. at 472.
55. Id. at 468.
56. Id. at 468–69, 472.
57. Id. at 472–76.
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to a narrow claim for the carbonized paper embodiment, but not to the
genus claim Edison was accused of infringing. 58
Incandescent Lamp demonstrates an outer limit on claim scope —
the claims are limited by what the patent teaches. 59 In Incandescent
Lamp, the sparse disclosure didn’t teach the PHOSITA how to find the
embodiments that worked without undue experimentation. 60 Indeed, it
wasn’t clear that there was any meaningful genus of “carbonized fibrous and textile materials” that could function as a light bulb filament. 61
Following Incandescent Lamp, in the 1928 case Corona Cord Tire
Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 62 the Supreme Court invalidated a broad
genus claim to a class of chemicals (guanidine derivatives) because the
patentee hadn’t shown that there was “any general quality common to
disubstituted guanidines which made them all effective” for use in the
process of the invention. 63 Here, too, there was evidence that a substantial number of the claimed embodiments didn’t work. 64
These cases show that providing a limited number of species in the
specification can’t serve as a “springboard” for claiming a genus if
those species aren’t representative of the entire genus. 65 Again, the patentee must give more (disclosure) to get more (scope). 66 This is the
commensurability requirement. It’s based on how much work the
PHOSITA would have to do to make and use the subject matter of the
patent claims. Given a claim of a particular scope, the number of examples the patent discloses can be a relevant factor in deciding
58. As Justice Henry Brown wrote, “the fact that paper belongs to the fibrous kingdom did
not invest [the patentees] with sovereignty over this entire kingdom.” Id. at 476.
59. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–
96 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that enablement’s purpose is to “ensure[] that the public
knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the
scope of the claims”); see also O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853) (holding
that Samuel Morse’s genus claim for all electronic communication made at a distance was
“too broad, and not warranted by law”).
60. To be sure, under modern enablement doctrine a court would invalidate the genus claim
after concluding that undue experimentation would be required to practice the full scope of
the genus claim. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The relevant Wands factors would
be the amount of guidance presented in the disclosure (which was limited), the existence of
working examples (only one provided), the breadth of the claims (very large), and the quantity
of experimentation required (substantial, as shown by Edison). See In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
61. See infra Part IV.
62. 276 U.S. 358 (1928).
63. Id. at 385; cf. Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (Incandescent Lamp),
159 U.S. 465, 472 (1895) (“If the patentees had discovered in fibrous and textile substances
a quality common to them all, or to them generally . . . and such quality or characteristic
adapted them peculiarly to incandescent conductors, such claim might not be too broad.”).
64. See Corona Cord, 276 U.S. at 385 (“[T]he experts show that there are between fifty
and one hundred substances which answer this description, of which there is quite a number
that are not accelerators at all.”).
65. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Carborundum Co., 155 F.2d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 1946).
66. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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commensurability and thus enablement, but it hasn’t generally been determinative. 67
B. The Traditional Role of Genus Claims in Chemistry
Genus claims provide the broadest scope of patent protection. 68
These (typically) broad claims use functional language 69 or generic formulas to cover individual embodiments of the invention, or species,
that share a common attribute or property. 70 For example, consider a
claim to a plastic-coated steel screw. Given that there are many different plastics (e.g., nylon, polystyrene, polypropylene, polyvinyl chloride), the genus claim encompasses many species. 71
Patentees opt for genus claims for two reasons. First, since patent
law doesn’t require an inventor to actually make each species covered
by a claim, 72 genus claims can afford broad scope with relatively limited experimentation. 73 Second, genus claims prevent competitors from
capturing the benefit of an invention (perhaps by making a minor variation to a molecule or changing the plastic used to make the screw)74
because an unauthorized use of any species within the scope of the
claimed genus is an act of patent infringement. 75
Although genus claims appear in all areas of technology, they are
ubiquitous in chemistry, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology — the
aforementioned unpredictable arts. 76 A common claiming technique is
to draw a core generic chemical structure with an array of substituents
(i.e., variables) appended to it — which can each represent numerous
chemical groups. 77 For example, the representative claim at issue in

67. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35 (discussing the Wands factors).
68. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 145–46.
69. Functional language describes an invention by what it does rather than by what it is. In
re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (allowing the use of functional claiming
and recognizing that it can be a “practical necessity”).
70. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008). Lefstin argues that most claims are genus claims.
For example, a claim reciting “a chair with four legs” would cover “chairs of all sorts of
materials, chairs of all sizes, chairs including contoured backrests, and chairs with roller
wheels, etc.” so long as they possess four legs. Id. at 1169–70.
71. Seymore, Patenting the Unexplained, supra note 5, at 729.
72. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 145–47; Seymore, Teaching
Function, supra note 23, at 628–32.
74. When patentees draft narrow claims, an imitator would find a minor variation over the
claimed embodiments, thereby rendering the patent useless. Merges & Nelson, supra note 13,
at 845.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
76. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
77. See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that the practice
of describing a class of chemical compounds in terms of structural formulas, where the substituents are recited in the claim language, has been allowed by courts).
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Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 78 the case to
which we will return in Part III, involved a claim to a five-membered
ring structure with variable moieties on the periphery of the ring represented by the numbered “R” groups (see Figure 1 below). 79 This traditional manner of chemical genus claiming can allow for a variety of
permutations, and therefore a large number of species, within the scope
of the claim. As a result, genus claims are pervasive in the unpredictable arts and have received considerable treatment in treatises, 80
books, 81 and voluminous case law. 82

Figure 1: The Generic Chemical Structure Claimed in Idenix
How much must a patentee teach to enable a genus claim in unpredictable fields like chemistry? The early chemical cases were somewhat stringent. For instance, in the 1957 case In re Shokal, 83 the CCPA
adopted the view that disclosure of “a single species can rarely, if ever,
afford sufficient support for a generic claim.” 84 By 1960, however, the
78. 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
79. Id. at 1154.
80. See, e.g., EMERSON STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 5090, at 61 (2d ed.
1952).
81. See, e.g., JOSEPH ROSSMAN, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR CHEMISTS 109–12 (1932);
EDWARD THOMAS, CHEMICAL INVENTIONS AND CHEMICAL PATENTS 323–25, 426–27
(1950); JOHN T. MAYNARD, UNDERSTANDING CHEMICAL PATENTS: A GUIDE FOR THE
INVENTOR 18–19 (1978).
82. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 137–148. In addition, chemical claims can be drafted
in a so-called “Markush group” form. See Ex parte Markush, 340 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 839,
839 (July 9, 1924); Driscoll, 562 F.2d at 1249 (allowing the practice); see also In re Harnisch,
631 F.2d 716, 719–20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining the history and current law of Markush
claiming practice).
83. 242 F.2d 771 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
84. Id. at 773. It is worth noting that this early case law somewhat conflated the concepts
that are today understood to be embodied in separate requirements under § 112(a) — enablement and written description. See, e.g., In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623, 625 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (cited in
Shokal, 242 F.2d at 773) (holding that a single working example with fluoride could not support the four-member genus of halogens). In Soll, the CCPA did not make clear whether the
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CCPA had moved away from Shokal and took the view that it is “manifestly impracticable” to require a detailed teaching “of every species
falling within [a genus], or even to name every such species.” 85 The
amount of teaching required to enable a genus claim “will vary, depending on the circumstances of particular cases.” 86 This liberalization
opened the door for patentees in unpredictable fields to obtain broader
genus claims with only a handful of working examples, 87 or even no
working examples, if the disclosure provided sufficient teaching. 88
A pivotal case illustrating this shift is In re Angstadt. 89 The genus
claim at issue, which encompassed thousands of species, was directed
to a method for catalytically transforming a class of organic compounds
with metal catalysts. Although the applicant disclosed forty examples
in the specification, the USPTO’s position was that the disclosure left
“too much to conjecture, speculation and experimentation” and was
nonenabling because (1) the forty examples didn’t teach across (and
were not representative of) the entire genus, and (2) the disclosure
didn’t set forth those catalyst features that would allow the PHOSITA
to produce materials with the intended function. 90 The CCPA reversed
the enablement rejection, explaining that requiring a more detailed disclosure “would force an inventor seeking adequate patent protection to
carry out a prohibitive number of actual experiments,” 91 which would
“tend to discourage inventors from filing patent applications in an
genus failed because the patent did not teach the PHOSITA how to make and use the full
scope of the genus, or because the failure to name more than one species in the specification
indicated a lack of “possession” of the genus. See id. For more on written description and
possession, see infra Section II.C.1.
85. In re Grimme, 274 F.2d 949, 952 (C.C.P.A. 1960). With respect to naming every species within a genus, recall the prior example where the patentee claimed “a plastic-coated
steel screw.” See supra text accompanying notes 69–71. Even if the disclosure only names or
exemplifies a handful of species (e.g., polystyrene, polyethylene, etc.), it could enable other
plastics that aren’t specifically recited (including plastics that did not exist at the time of filing).
86. In re Cavallito, 282 F.2d 357, 361 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (quoting Shokal, 242 F.2d at 773);
see also In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 910 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explaining that there is “no
magical relation” between the number of working examples disclosed and claim breadth); Ex
parte Sloane, 22 U.S.P.Q. 222, 1934 WL 25325, at *2 (P.O.B.A. Jan. 18, 1934) (“[W]e do
not think that a proper determination of the breadth of disclosure can be made solely from a
consideration of the specific examples given. If the disclosure, taken as a whole, is generic,
an applicant is entitled to generic claims if they are otherwise allowable.”).
87. Working examples are embodiments of the invention that have been made or performed, which show that the invention can really achieve the intended result. Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1528 (2011).
88. See In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232–34 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (upholding a genus
claim covering methods for removing chemicals from blood because the disclosure was sufficiently detailed and the PHOSITA’s level of skill was high, even though no working examples had been provided); see also Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 908 (explaining that there’s no
statutory basis for a working example requirement). The Supreme Court long ago allowed
this practice in a famous decision. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535–36 (1888).
89. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
90. Id. at 501–02.
91. Id. at 502–03.
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unpredictable area since the patent claims would have to be limited to
those embodiments which are expressly disclosed.” 92 Thus, the broad
genus claim was enabled — even if the PHOSITA had to engage in
some experiments to figure out which catalyst candidates worked and
which didn’t 93 — so long as the inventor demonstrated that some species do actually function as intended and provided direction for how to
test the rest. 94 Angstadt aligns with the inoperative embodiments doctrine discussed above, 95 and the claims at issue satisfy the commensurability requirement. 96 In Angstadt, unlike Incandescent Lamp, 97 there
really was a genus with embodiments that provided generally consistent
effects and multiple disclosed species that worked for the intended purpose, supporting the generalization made by the claim. 98
Early Federal Circuit opinions continued to resist enablement challenges to broad chemical genus claims. Consider Atlas Powder Co. v.
E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 99 where the patent at issue involved
emulsions 100 that were useful as blasting agents for mining and construction. 101 The genus claim covered various salts, fuels, and emulsifiers that could form thousands of emulsions. 102 The accused infringer
argued that the genus claim was not enabled because the specification
did not teach which combinations would work and thus was nothing
more than “a list of candidate ingredients.” 103 In addition, the record
included evidence that a considerable number of the claimed combinations were inoperative. 104 The accused infringer argued that this supposed lack of commensurability between the disclosure and the genus
claim would require the PHOSITA to experiment unduly to find an operable emulsion. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that “[i]t is not
a function of the claims to specifically exclude . . . possible inoperative
substances . . . .” 105 A detailed teaching was unnecessary because the
92. Id. at 503.
93. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 149.
94. See Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 503–04.
95. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
98. See Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 503.
99. 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
100. An emulsion “is a mixture of two [immiscible] liquids . . . with one of the liquids
appearing as dispersed globules in the second.” GIORA AGAM, INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS:
THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT 67 (1994).
101. Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1571.
102. Id. at 1576.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1577.
105. Id. at 1576 (quoting In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858–59 (C.C.P.A. 1974)); see
also In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that there is “nothing wrong”
with genus claims that encompass “vast numbers of inoperative embodiments” as long as the
PHOSITA can figure out what works and what doesn’t). But there seems to be an upper limit
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PHOSITA could readily select the proper ingredients using a “basic
principle of emulsion chemistry.” 106 Angstadt and Atlas Powder show
that courts would permit patentees to rely extensively on the
PHOSITA’s knowledge to provide enabling support for broad genus
claims.
With that understanding, genus claims make complete sense. A patentee can claim a structural group of chemicals with an invariant backbone and varied groups attached to that core. 107 As numerous
prosecution handbooks confirm, this is the typical kind of chemical genus claim that patent attorneys are taught to draft. 108 Some of those variants will work; others won’t. But the inventor of a genus can claim that
genus as long as there’s enough information that the PHOSITA can
identify some species within it that will work and determine how to
make those species without too much effort. 109 The prevalence of advice for such claiming reflects a widespread understanding that those
claims are valid.
C. Portents of Change
1. The Written Description Requirement
Section 112(a) of the Patent Act states that the patent’s specification “shall contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable a [PHOSITA] . . . to make
and use the same . . . .” 110 As noted above, this language provides the
statutory basis for the enablement requirement. 111 However, in the 1967
case In re Ruschig, 112 the CCPA held that § 112(a) embodies an additional disclosure requirement: the “written description” requirement.113
The issue is whether the specification, as of the filing date sought, conveys with reasonable clarity that the patentee “actually invented” the

on the amount of inoperability that will be tolerated. See Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1576–77
(“[I]f the number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in effect forces one
of ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the
claims might indeed be invalid.”).
106. Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1576.
107. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., CHRIS P. MILLER & MARK J. EVANS, THE CHEMIST’S COMPANION GUIDE
TO PATENT LAW 7–8, 7 n.4 (2010); supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018), discussed supra Section II.A.2.
111. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
112. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
113. Id. at 995–96. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the doctrine, see Katie
Albanese, When Is Enough Enough? What Constitutes Adequate Written Description of a
Genus, 29 FED. CIR. BAR J. 343 (2020).
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claimed subject matter. 114 The requirement is met if the claimed subject
matter is supported by an adequate description in the specification. 115
How does the written description requirement differ from enablement? In the 1971 chemical case, In re DiLeone, 116 the CCPA explained that one can “enable the practice of an invention as broadly as
it is claimed, and still not describe that invention.” 117 DiLeone provides
an illustration: “[C]onsider the case where the specification discusses
only compound A and contains no broadening language of any kind.
This might very well enable one skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has not been
described.” 118 The converse is also true. 119
While they are separate requirements, both enablement and written
description share a policy objective: to prevent overreaching (and thus
limit what can be patented) by requiring a correspondence between
what is disclosed and what is claimed. 120 Enablement compels the patentee to teach the PHOSITA how to make and use an invention as
broadly as it is claimed without undue experimentation; 121 written description requires the patentee to describe the invention in sufficient
detail to allow the PHOSITA to recognize that the inventor actually
invented what is claimed. 122 But to meet the written description requirement — for genus claims as for any others — it was traditionally sufficient for the patentee to simply mention the genus in the specification
or among the originally filed claims. 123 In addition, as DiLeone suggests, listing some species belonging to the genus in the specification,
along with broadening language, might also have been enough to adequately describe a genus claim. 124
Early on, the written description requirement came into play only
in two scenarios, both involving the problem of timing: (1) when claims
not presented in the original patent application were amended or added
114. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995.
115. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
116. 436 F.2d 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
117. Id. at 1405 (emphases added).
118. Id. at 1405 n.1.
119. In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d 676, 677 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (citation omitted) (“Although
appellant’s specification describes the invention as broadly as it is claimed, thereby eliminating any issue concerning the description requirement, a specification which ‘describes’ does
not necessarily also ‘enable’ [the PHOSITA] to make or use the claimed invention.”).
120. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561 (noting that the written description requirement
guards against overreaching).
121. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
122. Cf. In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he description must
clearly allow [the PHOSITA] to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”).
Descriptive means include “words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set
forth the claimed invention.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
123. Cf. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Rader, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc) (discussing this case law).
124. See In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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to that application during prosecution, 125 or (2) when the inventor
sought the benefit of the filing date of the original patent application
for claims of a later-filed, co-pending application (known as a “continuation” application). 126 The key question common to these two scenarios is whether the specification provides “adequate support” for any
claim that did not appear in the patent application at the time of filing. 127 As stated by the CCPA, “[t]he function of the description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing
date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later
claimed by him.” 128 Early Federal Circuit opinions agreed, noting that
the “purpose and applicability” of the written description requirement
was “where the claim at issue was filed subsequent to the filing of the
application.” 129
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. The inventor
files a patent application claiming “a stainless steel rake having a hardwood handle.” The specification discloses numerous species of hardwood, including beech, hickory, maple, oak, and walnut. It also
explains how to make and use the rake. While the application is pending
at the USPTO, the inventor seeks to amend the application by adding a
genus claim that recites “a stainless steel rake having a wooden handle.” 130 Note that this claim comprises a larger genus because “wood”
is broader than “hardwood.” Enablement isn’t an issue because rakemaking is a predictable technology. 131 But unfortunately for the inventor, the specification only describes and exemplifies hardwoods. Accordingly, as the Federal Circuit held in Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline
Corp., the USPTO will deny the amendment (or a court will invalidate
125. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560.
126. Id. A continuation application is a second application for the same invention disclosed
in a parent (i.e., original) application that is filed before the parent application either issues as
a patent or becomes abandoned. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2018). It has the identical specification as
the parent and enjoys the benefit of the parent’s earlier filing date. Id.; MPEP § 201.07 (9th
ed. Rev. 4, June 2020). Applicants file continuation applications for many reasons. For example, an applicant may decide to prosecute a parent application with narrow claims (which
may issue relatively quickly) and then prosecute broader claims in a continuation application.
See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 161–62 (4th ed. 2006).
127. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560.
128. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (emphasis added).
129. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1562 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910,
914 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); see also Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that, in the context of claiming entitlement to the priority date of
an earlier application, the written description requirement is met if “the disclosure of the application relied upon ‘reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at
that time of the later claimed subject matter’” (quoting In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1983))).
130. Applicants broaden claims during prosecution for a variety of reasons, including a
desire to ensnare a competitor’s product. See, e.g., Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134
F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
131. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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the claims) for a lack of written description because “[the] original disclosure serves to limit the permissible breadth of [the] later-drafted
claims.” 132
In sum, the traditional role of written description was to act as “a
timing mechanism to ensure fair play in the presentation of claims after
the original filing date and to guard against manipulation of that process
by the patent applicant.” 133 As of the 1980s, then, written description
was a separate requirement from enablement, but it was limited to the
timing of claims and thus designed to prevent what we might call “late
claiming” — obtaining a claim based on later knowledge or realization,
but trying to get the benefit of an earlier filing date. 134 This form of
written description, however, didn’t pose a threat to genus claims unless such claims were added after filing and the specification included
no indication that the researchers believed that their invention was generic. 135
2. The Rise and Nature of Biotechnological Inventions
The requirements of enablement and written description come up
frequently in biotechnology patent cases, and many of the cases we discuss that limit genus claims come from biotechnology. During the
1980s, the Federal Circuit routinely upheld genus claims in the biotechnology field against § 112(a) challenges. Two seminal cases during this
era involved “monoclonal antibodies.” 136 In Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 137 the genus claim covered an “immunoassay”
method employing highly sensitive monoclonal antibodies to determine
the presence or concentration of an antigen. 138 In this infringement litigation, the defendant asserted that the patent was invalid for nonenablement because the specification failed to disclose either how to make
monoclonal antibodies or how to screen them to achieve the claimed
132. Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479.
133. Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 638 (2002) (quoted in PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
134. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(explaining that the written description requirement focuses on preventing a patentee from
“later asserting that he invented that which he did not”).
135. See, e.g., In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
136. Monoclonal antibodies are man-made proteins designed to find and attach to specific
antigens (e.g., viruses or bacteria) circulating throughout the body. Once attached, they can
force the immune system to destroy cells containing the antigen. The term “monoclonal”
means that the man-made antibody is synthesized by clones from a single parent immune cell.
Monoclonal antibodies are used extensively in R&D and as treatments for various diseases,
infections, and cancers. See RICHARD COICO & GEOFFREY SUNSHINE, IMMUNOLOGY: A
SHORT COURSE 80–81 (2015).
137. 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
138. Id. at 1369–71. “Sensitivity” is the ability of an antibody to detect and bind to a particular antigen. Id. at 1369.
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sensitivity. 139 The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments, noting that
the synthetic and screening techniques were well-known in the art and
that there wasn’t “a shred of evidence that undue experimentation was
required by [the PHOSITA] to practice the invention.” 140 The court famously stated that “a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what
is well known in the art.” 141
In the other seminal case, In re Wands, the genus claim covered an
immunoassay method employing highly sensitive monoclonal antibodies capable of detecting a hepatitis B antigen. 142 The issue was whether
the disclosure enabled practicing the genus claim without undue experimentation. 143 In order to make the antibodies to practice the patented
method, the PHOSITA would have had to engage in an extensive
amount of experimentation that included isolating and cloning specialized cells, culturing them, testing the antibodies they produced to determine which would bind to the hepatitis B antigen, and further
screening to select those with the claimed sensitivity. 144 Applying the
aforementioned Wands factors, 145 however, the court determined that
the claim was enabled because the specification gave considerable direction, guidance, and working examples; the PHOSITA’s level of skill
was high; and all of the required methods were well known in the art. 146
Enablement was not precluded, even if extensive routine experimentation was needed to practice the invention, because “[t]he key word is
‘undue,’ not ‘experimentation.’” 147
For the Federal Circuit in the 1980s, then, biotechnology was a new
technology, but it didn’t call for new legal doctrine. The enablement
question continued to apply as it had within other scientific fields —
can the PHOSITA figure out how to make and use species within a
claimed genus without too much work or too many false starts? The
written description requirement remained limited to the problem of lack
of specification support for claims added after filing. 148
But all that was about to change.

139. Id. at 1384.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d
1452, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). But cf. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the patentee cannot rely heavily on PHOSITA knowledge
outside of the specification to enable the “novel aspects” of the claim).
142. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
143. Id. at 736–37.
144. Id. at 737–38.
145. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
146. Wands, 858 F.2d at 740.
147. Id. at 737 (quoting In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
148. See, e.g., In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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III. THE MODERN ERA: GENUS CLAIMS FAIL IN COURT
Courts’ initially favorable response to biotechnology patents
helped to spur research and development in this industry and to bring
forth groundbreaking, commercially significant inventions. 149 But the
trend soon began to reverse. Beginning in the 1990s, defendants in biotechnology and even traditional chemistry cases began to turn to
§ 112(a) as a critical shield, 150 putting pressure on this provision’s functions of policing claim overbreadth and early patenting. 151 The strategy
bore fruit, as the Federal Circuit increasingly came to rely on the enablement requirement, as well as a powerful new variant of the written
description requirement, to strike down generic patent claims in the life
science fields. Indeed, ten years ago, Dmitry Karshtedt observed that
the court’s enablement and written description opinions in the 1990s
and 2000s showed “discomfort with broad claims of biotechnology.” 152
In this Article, we show that in the past decade the Federal Circuit
extended this trend to traditional chemistry genus claims — and has
frequently done so in ways that disserve the purposes of the § 112(a)
doctrine. Successful recent lines of attack by patent challengers include
arguments pointing out inadequate guidance for how the patent specification’s teachings would translate across the genus’s full scope; 153 an
excessive amount of experimentation needed to identify potentially inoperative claim embodiments; 154 and the lack of precise structural information in the specification about the bounds of the genus. 155 While
some prior precedent exists for these approaches to invalidating patents

149. For another significant example of a pro-biotechnology decision involving a different
section of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101, see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
150. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d
488, 495–96 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). See generally Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement
and Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233 (2000).
151. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 128–30; Karen S. Canady,
Note, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455,
461–62 (1994).
152. Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 109, 154 (2011) [hereinafter Karshtedt, Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions]. While Karshtedt
argues that the claims to so-called “biologics” that are the focus of that paper are nonenabled,
the mostly chemical claims we discuss in this Article present significantly different issues.
153. Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
154. Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
155. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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for inadequate disclosure, 156 their deployment has become significantly
more vigorous over time.
The resulting shift is dramatic, as we show in this Part. Among the
earlier cases, one is hard-pressed to find appellate decisions invalidating claims under § 112(a) based on notions of claim overbreadth or of
“gun jumping” by filing an application too early in the research process. 157 By contrast, in the past thirty years, there are virtually no significant examples of genus claims in the life science fields upheld on
appeal as compliant with § 112(a) outside the unique context of interference proceedings. 158 The Federal Circuit’s shift in its approach to
genus claims and the regularity with which those claims are now struck
down reflect a fundamental — and not widely appreciated — change
in patent doctrine.
A. Rejecting Claims on Enablement Grounds
1. The Antecedents of Doctrinal Drift
The tightening of § 112(a) began in the early 1990s. A significant
case in this line is Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., in which
patents relating to gene-mediated synthesis of a protein called erythropoietin (“EPO”) were invalidated for lack of enablement. 159 EPO is a
hormone that “stimulates the production of red blood cells” and is
therefore valuable in the treatment of “anemias or blood disorders characterized by low or defective bone marrow production of red blood
cells.” 160 Given the prevalence of these disorders, isolated EPO has
been a highly sought-after therapeutic, and the litigation was a hardfought battle between U.S. and Japanese biotechnology giants competing in this space. 161 The claims asserted against Amgen were invalidated based on the evidence that the method in the specification did not
156. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 833, 837 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Rainer, 390 F.2d
771, 775–76 (C.C.P.A. 1968). Cf. generally Kevin T. Richards, Note, Experimentation and
Patent Validity: Restoring the Supreme Court’s Incandescent Lamp Patent Precedent, 101
VA. L. REV. 1545, 1575–76 (2015) (arguing that Supreme Court precedent supports an enablement standard that is less patent-friendly than Wands).
157. For typical examples of § 112(a) failures from the 1980s, see Quaker City Gear
Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming the judgment of
nonenablement where matter critical for practicing the claimed invention was incorporated
by reference from an unavailable publication); In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1521 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (affirming a written description rejection of claims to subject matter not disclosed in
the original patent application); White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713
F.2d 788, 790–92 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding claims nonenabled where technology necessary
to practice the invention was kept as trade secret).
158. For a discussion of interference proceedings, see infra Section III.C.1.
159. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1215–17 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
160. Id. at 1203.
161. See Michael S. Greenfield, Note, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling with the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1051–55, 1064 (1992).
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actually produce the EPO with the claimed activity, which is a fairly
uncontroversial application of the enablement requirement. 162 By contrast, in its own patent that it asserted against Chugai, Amgen did actually teach how to make some EPO analogs. 163
Nonetheless, Amgen ran into an overbreadth-based enablement
challenge. Amgen’s representative claim was directed to a genus of deoxyribonucleic acids (“DNAs”) — molecules of life known more commonly as genes 164 — as defined by their function of producing EPO
and its analogs: “A purified and isolated DNA sequence . . . encoding
a polypeptide having an amino acid sequence sufficiently duplicative
of that of [EPO] to allow possession of the biological property of causing bone marrow cells to increase production of . . . red blood cells, and
to increase hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake.” 165
The Federal Circuit noted that this claim encompasses a “potentially enormous” number of isolated DNA sequences. 166 Any sequence
that will encode for and thus cause the production of EPO or EPO-like
products — proteins with a structure similar enough to EPO to generate
red blood cells — would be covered by this claim. 167 The court
acknowledged that “a patent applicant is entitled to claim his invention
generically” when the claims “are of a scope appropriate to the invention disclosed.” 168 But it explained that the specification of Amgen’s
patent had “little enabling disclosure” of the potential DNA variants
encoding EPO, or of “how to make them.” 169 After further flagging “the
manifold possibilities for change in [the claimed] structure, with attendant uncertainty as to what utility will be possessed by these analogs,” the Federal Circuit concluded that “[i]t is not sufficient, having
made the gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been
clearly ascertained, to claim all possible genetic sequences that have
EPO-like activity.” 170
Amgen’s claims thus presented a commensurability problem. 171
Indeed, because the specification disclosed only a few examples of a
large and complex genus of DNAs whose varied structures could
162. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1215–17.
163. See id. at 1213.
164. If this case were decided today, the claims would have likely been invalid for the
separate reason that isolated genomic DNA is not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
165. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204.
166. Id. at 1213.
167. See id. at 1212. Note this functional aspect of the claim. As we discuss below, this is
a hallmark of many claims that the Federal Circuit has properly invalidated under § 112(a),
but the court’s doctrinal path has also endangered claims that we believe to be deserving. See
infra notes 283–287 and accompanying text.
168. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213–14.
169. Id. at 1213.
170. Id. at 1214.
171. See supra Section II.A.3.
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unpredictably affect their EPO-producing function, the Federal Circuit
did not even formally consider the Wands factors before readily reaching the conclusion of nonenablement. 172 But the attitude of the opinion
differs markedly from the CCPA’s In re Angstadt decision. 173 That
court, one will recall, 174 upheld a rather broad claim against a nonenablement challenge in part because of, rather than in spite of, the fact
that identifying working embodiments within the claims’ scope required “the types and amount of experimentation which the uncertainty
of [the] art makes inevitable.” 175 In so doing, the CCPA rewarded a
significant discovery in the unpredictable field of chemistry with the
meaningful protection of a broad genus claim. 176
To be sure, one could have distinguished Amgen from Angstadt on
the respective cases’ facts and invalidated the Amgen claims by comfortably applying the Angstadt precedent. The Angstadt claims were in
the well-established field of chemical catalysis that, to channel the immortal words of Donald Rumsfeld, brought with it “known unknowns” 177 — an evocative version of the CCPA’s nod to the
inevitable but acceptable uncertainty involved in practicing Angstadt’s
invention. 178 In contrast, Amgen dealt with the field of recombinant
DNA technology that was just emerging when the applications that matured into the patents in suit were filed, bringing with it many “unknown unknowns.” 179 In addition, and in further contrast to Angstadt,
Amgen’s claims were largely defined by the function of EPO-like activity and did not include much in the way of actual structure, unlike
the catalysts described in Angstadt. 180 The Amgen court, however, did
not attempt to distinguish Angstadt. 181 As we show in this Section, the
Federal Circuit’s failure to square Angstadt with its later § 112(a) case
172. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213.
173. 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
174. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
175. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504; cf. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that some areas of science require laborious experimentation to practice inventions
in spite of “a high level of skill in the art”).
176. Cf. Canady, supra note 151, at 457–58 (noting that in certain fields of technology,
extensive experimentation is inevitable).
177. David A. Graham, Rumsfeld’s Knowns and Unknowns: The Intellectual History of a
Quip, ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/
rumsfelds-knowns-and-unknowns-the-intellectual-history-of-a-quip/359719
[https://perma.cc/TR6X-PLFV].
178. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 504.
179. For another example in which the nascent nature of the field led to the conclusion of
nonenablement, see Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir.
1997). See also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (exemplifying a similar approach in the context of the written description requirement); Seymore,
Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 149.
180. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1204, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
181. Id. at 1213 (citing Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 502–03, but only to support the innocuous
proposition that “it is not necessary that a patent applicant test all the embodiments of his
invention”).
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law has led to instability and, ultimately, a marked doctrinal drift. Any
broad genus claim, not just one in an emerging field, would soon become vulnerable.
In addition to the Federal Circuit’s increased scrutiny of claim
overbreadth, groundwork for change was created by the court’s subtle
but significant recasting of the sorts of experimentation that can be considered undue under the Wands standard. That shift arguably began in
a 1999 biotechnology enablement opinion, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Calgene, Inc. 182 This case involved “antisense” technology that, as the
court held, was also claimed in a plainly overbroad manner. 183 Briefly,
antisense is a method for regulating the gene-mediated production of
proteins with the aid of synthetic DNA molecules. 184 This technology
embodies a powerful method of controlling the body’s immune response, and has therefore paved the way for therapies that can treat inflammations and various autoimmune disorders. The claims
encompassed antisense-promoting synthetic DNAs “present in a prokaryotic and eukaryotic cell containing a gene” and prokaryotic or eukaryotic cells containing those DNAs. 185 The inventors got the
antisense technology to work in some genes of the E. coli bacteria, disclosed those methods in the specification, and asserted that antisense
was generalizable to other genes and organisms, including eukaryotes. 186
The Federal Circuit found that all the Wands factors pointed towards nonenablement: the claims were broad; the technology, nascent
and unpredictable; and the experimentation needed to practice it, especially in eukaryotes, challenging and rife with failure. 187 As to the direction in the specification and working examples, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that the patents “provided little guidance . . . as to the practice of antisense in cells other than E. coli,
and that such minimal disclosure constituted no more than a plan or
invitation to practice antisense in those cells.” 188
But the Enzo court didn’t stop there. While the experimentation
needed to practice the claimed invention there was anything but routine,
the court implied in passing that even routine experimentation can
sometimes be “undue” within the Wands framework if it is too
182. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 1368, 1377.
184. An example of “gene expression” is production of EPO mediated by the EPO genes,
discussed above in the context of the Amgen case. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text.
185. Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1368. Prokaryotes are lower organisms such as the well-known E.
coli bacteria, while eukaryotes are higher organisms like animals and plants. Id. at 1366 n.2.
186. Id. at 1367–68. The defendant’s product was a tomato, which is eukaryotic. Id. at
1377.
187. Id. at 1370–74.
188. Id. at 1375.
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extensive. 189 This seemingly insignificant, almost throwaway, language has nonetheless been used to great effect in recent enablement
cases. 190 The Federal Circuit affirmatively restated Enzo’s “routine”
notion in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 191 decided in
2010, when it observed that “[e]nablement is not precluded where a
‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required to practice
a claimed invention, however, [sic] such experimentation must not be
‘undue.’” 192 Although ALZA itself did not deal with a generically
claimed invention, a series of subsequent Federal Circuit decisions
striking down chemical genus claims made much use of the “routine
but undue” argument. 193 This theory further paved the way for invalidating claims directed to technologies that, unlike recombinant DNA
or antisense, were not nascent or emerging, but arguably unpredictable
only in the “known unknowns” sense that the CCPA had previously
found acceptable in cases like Angstadt and Atlas Powder. 194
2. The New Law of Genus Claim Nonenablement
Of late, § 112(a) has been applied with increasing rigor against patents in areas with “known unknowns.” The first opinion in this line of
cases, Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories, 195 involved a traditional chemical
genus rather than a biotechnological invention. 196 The underlying discovery addressed a condition called restenosis, which is the re-narrowing of an artery after a catheter has been used to open it. 197 The claims
recited a method of treating this condition with a therapeutically effective amount of a chemical belonging to the class of compounds called
“rapamycin.” 198 The rapamycin compounds all have a particular “macrocyclic” (i.e., large-ring) structure, but one of the chemical groups
189. Id. at 1371.
190. Cf. Matthew D. Kellam, Comment, Making Sense Out of Antisense: The Enablement
Requirement in Biotechnology After Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 76 IND. L.J. 221, 227 (2001)
(“Avoiding trial and error experiments and unpredictable results in this field is impossible.”
(citation omitted)); Canady, supra note 151, at 457–58.
191. 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. See infra Section III.A.2.
194. See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text; cf. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220,
223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[T]here may be times when the well-known unpredictability of chemical reactions will alone be enough to create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad statement put forward as enabling . . . . This will especially be the case where the
statement is, on its face, contrary to generally accepted scientific principles.”). This older view
thus held that claims failed enablement if the underlying subject matter could not be made at
all because it did not work, and a genus was therefore not really invented. That is very different than saying it is routine but time-consuming to figure out all the operable species in the
genus.
195. 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
196. Id. at 1384.
197. Id. at 1382.
198. Id.
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attached to the ring is allowed to vary. 199 The inventors thus claimed
the class of potential therapeutic agents much as one would claim a traditional chemical genus. While many such claims are directed to a
structure with an invariant chemical core and a “wild-card” substituent
denominated as “R,” “X,” or some other indicator of a variable chemical group, 200 the patentee simply used the word “rapamycin” to refer to
the entire generic chemical structure, in which the substituent indicated
by the dashed oval in Figure 2 below can vary. 201

Figure 2: The Generic Chemical Structure Claimed in Wyeth
The specification demonstrated that at least one of the species
within the rapamycin genus, “sirolimus,” was effective in treating restenosis. 202 It also disclosed assays for testing whether other rapamycins
have the requisite therapeutic property. 203 Further supporting enablement, an expert explained in an affidavit that the PHOSITA would
know that a substituent group must be below a certain molecular weight
in order to have an antirestenotic function. 204 But all of this wasn’t
enough. After noting that even routine experimentation “is not ‘without
bounds’” under the undue experimentation standard, 205 the Federal Circuit cited ALZA for the proposition that the need for “an iterative, trial199. Id.
200. See supra Section II.B.
201. Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1383.
202. Id. at 1384.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1386 (quoting Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2013)).
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and-error process to practice the claimed invention even with the help
of the . . . specification” can lead to an enablement problem. 206 It therefore invalidated the claims on summary judgment, explaining that the
synthesis of the “tens of thousands of candidate[]” sirolimus compounds was laborious, the assays were time-consuming, 207 and the
guidance on structural parameters that could help the PHOSITA more
expediently identify the working species within the claimed genus was
inadequate. 208
The genus in Wyeth is reasonably large. Nevertheless, the problem
in Wyeth is one of “known unknowns.” Specifically, identifying antirestenotic members of the rapamycin genus may have been time-consuming, but it was solvable with the aid of established techniques of
organic synthesis and the assays disclosed in the specification. 209 This
is a far cry from cases like Enzo, in which the inventors demonstrated
a proof of concept of just-discovered antisense technology in E. coli
and then claimed antisense DNA for every living organism under the
sun. 210 Instead, the facts of Wyeth are much closer to those of Angstadt,
in which the CCPA allowed the broad genus claims after concluding
that a follow-on inventor could ascertain whether any particular compound satisfying the claim’s structural limitations works for the intended catalytic purpose by testing it out. 211 Practicing the claims in
Wyeth, as in Angstadt, didn’t seem to require “ingenuity beyond that to
be expected of one of ordinary skill in the art,” and yet the patentee lost
in Wyeth and won in Angstadt. 212
Key to the different results seems to be a significant but
unacknowledged shift in how the Federal Circuit thinks about enablement of genus claims. Angstadt and Atlas Powder are focused on the
practical challenge facing the PHOSITA — how to make and use a species within the genus. If it’s too hard to find one that works, either because the claimed genus itself isn’t really a well-defined genus, as in
Incandescent Lamp, 213 or because of the related problem that the
206. Id. (quoting ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 943 (Fed. Cir.
2010)).
207. Id. at 1385.
208. Id. at 1386.
209. Id. at 1384–85.
210. See supra notes 182–188 and accompanying text.
211. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503 (C.C.P.A. 1976). One difference from Wyeth is that
the compounds that must be synthesized and experimented on to practice the claims in
Angstadt are inorganic rather than organic. But as two of us can attest (Karshtedt and Seymore; Lemley is not a chemist), inorganic synthesis is no easier than organic synthesis, and
some would say much tougher. See generally Ruren Xu, Introduction, in MODERN
INORGANIC SYNTHETIC CHEMISTRY 1–7 (Ruren Xu & Yan Xu eds., 2d ed. 2017) (exploring
the challenges, rigor, and “major scientific issues” in modern synthetic inorganic chemistry).
212. Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 503 (quoting Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1390–91
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
213. See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
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number of inoperative species is too high, 214 the PHOSITA would have
to engage in undue experimentation.
The Wyeth court, by contrast, was worried that the synthesis of the
“tens of thousands of candidate[]” sirolimus compounds would require
undue experimentation. 215 That does indeed sound like a lot of work.
But why would the PHOSITA have to synthesize tens of thousands of
candidates? 216 Even if half or more of the species in the genus don’t
work (and there was no evidence that this was actually the case in Wyeth), on average (i.e., working at random) the PHOSITA might have to
try two or three candidates before finding one that does. Nevertheless,
Wyeth reflects a move away from this kind of pragmatic thinking. To
gauge whether the “full scope” of the genus claim is enabled, the Federal Circuit seems to implicitly assume that the PHOSITA must test
every species within the genus for enablement purposes. That’s a significant new requirement and one that will prove impossible to meet for
any sufficiently large genus. And the implications are problematic: as
the CCPA observed in a related context, “[r]equiring specific testing of
the thousands of [chemical] analogs encompassed by the present claim
in order to satisfy the how-to-use requirement of § 112 would delay
disclosure and frustrate, rather than further, the interests of the public.” 217
As two 2019 Federal Circuit opinions confirm, however, the Wyeth
view has now won out. In addition, these latest cases have reinforced a
troubling dynamic involving therapeutic efficacy limitations in claims
that also include a chemical genus. In Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Roche
Molecular Systems, Inc., 218 the court emphasized that “[a]s in Wyeth,
the asserted claims here require not just a particular structure, but a particular functionality.” 219 The court then concluded that the claims were
not enabled because “the specification fails to teach one of skill in the
art whether the many embodiments of the broad claims would exhibit
that required functionality.” 220 Therapeutic efficacy is a claim-narrowing limitation, so one would think that it is easier to enable a claim that
is so limited as opposed to a broader, purely structural claim. But the
Federal Circuit seemed to say that such limitations in fact made the patentee’s job more difficult. The court explained that “even if we assume
that the specification teaches one of skill in the art how to create the
214. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
215. Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
216. See id. (“[T]here is no genuine dispute that it would be necessary to first synthesize
and then screen each candidate compound using the assays disclosed in the specification to
determine whether it has immunosuppressive and antirestenotic effects.”).
217. In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
218. 928 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019). This is a different Enzo case than the one discussed
above and we refer to it as “Roche.”
219. Id. at 1346.
220. Id.
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broad range of [structures] covered by the claims . . . the specification
still fails to teach one of skill in the art which combinations” will produce a product with the claimed functional properties. 221
The Federal Circuit’s analysis of the functionality limitation in
Roche suffers from the same problem as the “antirestenosis effective”
limitation in Wyeth. Yes, the PHOSITA needs to find a species that
works. But the PHOSITA doesn’t need to find every species that works
to make and use the invention. It is enough to get hold of just one, or
perhaps a few, structural analogs within the genus that accomplish the
claimed or intended purpose. The Federal Circuit seems concerned that
we don’t know the exact boundaries of the genus if operability is an
element of the patent claim. But so what? The concern of enablement
law has always been with practical workability: Does the patent teach
others what they need to know? 222 Wyeth and Roche represent a categorical shift in thinking away from teaching the PHOSITA and toward
a precise delineation of the boundaries of the claim — even when, as in
those cases, the genus was well defined as a matter of structure. 223
The second notable case from 2019, Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC
v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 224 cemented that shift. In Idenix, a divided
panel held that the claims at issue failed both the written description225
and enablement requirements as a matter of law. 226 The representative
claim was directed to “[a] method for the treatment of a hepatitis C
virus infection, comprising administering an effective amount of a purine or pyrimidine ß-D-2’-methyl-ribofuranosyl nucleoside [depicted in
Figure 3 below].” 227

221. Id.
222. Cf. Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that full-scope enablement does not require enablement of a specific embodiment of
the claim); In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noting that “given the complexities of zoom lens design, the determination, while routine, could be very time-consuming”
but explaining that this in itself is not enough to find the claims nonenabled). In Cook, the
CCPA ultimately did strike down the claims because the inventors “never produced . . . calculations to substantiate the truthfulness of the teaching in their specification which the examiner challenged.” Cook, 439 F.2d at 736. This is a more traditional view of the enablement
requirement, which demands a showing that the inventor demonstrate how the PHOSITA
could build an embodiment of the invention.
223. Cf. supra Section II.B.
224. 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
225. For a discussion of the written description part of Idenix, see infra Section III.B.
226. Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1153.
227. Id. at 1155.
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Figure 3: The Generic Chemical Structure Claimed in Idenix
While the claimed invention ultimately recites a method of treating
the hepatitis C virus (“HCV”), the structural limitation depicted above
follows the standard approach to claiming chemical compositions generically. 228 As in Wyeth, the chemical backbone (here, called a
“furanosyl nucleoside”) has an invariant core and some variable chemical groups on the periphery. The Idenix panel majority had no trouble
invalidating this patent, and even Judge Pauline Newman in dissent argued only that it should have been upheld under the significantly narrower claim construction that she favored. 229
As in Wyeth, the majority began by observing that the genus was
large. It noted that while the claimed structure is limited to a methyl in
the 2’-up (i.e., R6) position, “the formula provides more than a dozen
options at the R1 position, more than a dozen independent options at
the 2’-down position [(R7)], more than a dozen independent options at
the 3’-down position [(R9)], and multiple independent options for the
base.” 230 Estimating the factorial, one finds that the total number of
possible structures within the scope of the claim reaches into several
thousand species.
But such large numbers are typical in chemical genus claiming 231 — and having a massive genus of compounds to be tested for
catalytic activity didn’t ultimately result in an enablement problem in
Angstadt or Atlas Powder, neither of which Idenix cited. Moreover, as
228. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
229. Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1167 (Newman, J., dissenting). Claim construction is an exercise
of determining claim scope that must often be performed before patent validity is determined.
Often, claims fail on § 112(a) grounds in cases in which the patentee seeks a broad claim
construction. See, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
230. Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1158 (majority opinion).
231. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 12, at 146 (“Indeed, a single generic
claim can easily encompass millions, billions, or [more] compounds.” (citations omitted)).
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the district court in Idenix recognized, the knowledge of the PHOSITA
could help reduce the number of potential working species based on the
judgment that certain substitution patterns would prevent a species
from functioning as efficacious therapy against HCV infections. 232
With the genus thus limited, Idenix further explained that some candidate species could be bought off the shelf as part of a compound library,
while others could be synthesized using routine methodologies. 233 Finally, the specification provided several working embodiments, and the
Federal Circuit agreed that the record supported all these findings. 234
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the patent leaves one
“searching for a needle in a haystack to determine which of the ‘large
number’ of 2’-methyl-up nucleosides falls into the ‘small’ group of
candidates that effectively treats HCV.” 235 Applying Wyeth, it held that
the PHOSITA would just have too many compounds to obtain and
screen because it was not possible to tell in advance for many candidates whether their structures would have the desired HCV-treating
property. 236 As the Federal Circuit framed it, “[t]he key enablement
question is whether a [PHOSITA] would know, without undue experimentation, which 2’-methyl-up nucleosides would be effective for
treating HCV,” and the answer was “no.” 237 Even accepting that the
disclosed screening process allowed for straightforward identification
of working embodiments, the court determined the work involved to be
excessive for enablement purposes. 238 While any individual molecule
that falls within the scope of the genus and is effective against HCV
might be readily found, the overall sorting process was held to require
undue experimentation. 239
This approach is problematic. It focuses on “knowing” instead of
“making and using,” which is what the text of § 112(a) actually requires, and discounts Angstadt’s warning that ex ante “reasonable certainty” that a particular chemical structure would work for its intended
purpose cannot be required to enable the claims. 240 As the CCPA
232. Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 14-846-LPS, 2018 WL 922125, at *14
(D. Del. Feb. 16, 2018); see Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1158.
233. Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1159–60.
234. Id. at 1161.
235. Id. at 1162.
236. Id. at 1162–63 (citing Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir.
2013)).
237. Id. at 1156.
238. Id. at 1162–63.
239. Cf. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 959 F.3d 1091, 1100 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 2020) (“In cases involving claims that state certain structural requirements and also require performance of some function (e.g., efficacy for a certain purpose), we have explained
that undue experimentation can include undue experimentation in identifying, from among
the many concretely identified compounds that meet the structural requirements, the compounds that satisfy the functional requirement.” (citing Idenix, Roche, Wyeth, Enzo, and
ALZA)).
240. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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astutely noted, if such a requirement were imposed, “then all ‘experimentation’ is ‘undue,’ since the term ‘experimentation’ implies that the
success of the particular activity is uncertain.” 241 Even though “thousands” of candidates exist and the catalysis field as a whole is “an unpredictable art,” the Angstadt genus was enabled because “[i]n this art
the performance of trial runs using different catalysts is ‘reasonable,’
even if the end result is uncertain.” 242 Such unpredictability was characteristic of this mature field — and traversing the claimed genus was
a matter of “known unknowns.”
But that’s no longer the law. After Wyeth and Idenix, uncertainty
with respect to whether some subset of species of a chemical genus
would achieve the recited therapeutic efficacy — in other words,
whether any given species is within the boundaries of the claim — can
be a fatal flaw for enablement purposes. This is true even when the
patentee attends to the field’s inevitable unpredictability by disclosing
a screening mechanism that gives the PHOSITA parameters for “making and using” any given embodiment within the structural genus of the
claimed invention.
To be sure, even under older Federal Circuit precedents like Atlas
Powder, defendants could in theory try to invalidate a claim for lack of
enablement if they could demonstrate that so many embodiments
within the scope of the claim didn’t actually work for the invention’s
intended purpose so that the PHOSITA, like Edison in Incandescent
Lamp, would have to try hundreds or thousands to find one that worked
well. 243 But it’s crucial to point out that those were not the showings
made in Wyeth and Idenix. Indeed, in both cases, the respective defendants did find a species within the genus that worked perfectly well 244 —
and they didn’t demonstrate that the research leading to this actual result was difficult to accomplish in view of the patent’s disclosure (or
that a significant number, or even any, of the species within the genus
were ineffective). Instead, the respective defendants argued that all the
operative embodiments would be time-consuming to identify, and the
court accepted this evidence by itself as decisive of invalidity. 245
This doctrinal shift is a massive change in the Federal Circuit’s enablement doctrine. The court once seemed to suggest that “operability
241. Id.
242. Id. at 502–04.
243. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); see Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (Incandescent Lamp), 159
U.S. 465, 472–73 (1895).
244. See Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1171–73 (Newman, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 1153 (majority opinion) (noting the Food and Drug Administration
approval of the defendant’s product); Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (noting that the defendant came up with a commercial product covered by the nowinvalidated claim).
245. See Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1162–63; Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1385–86.
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limitations” in patent claims can forestall enablement problems altogether by limiting the scope of the genus to only the species that work
for their intended purpose. 246 But we’ve now reached the point that
adding such limitations can present nearly insurmountable § 112(a) difficulties for inventors seeking genus claims that also recite a functional
property of the compounds.
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s latest enablement case law suggests
that the process of sorting operative from inoperative embodiments,
whether routine or not, may be emerging as a critical challenge for patentees defending against claims of nonenablement. The enablement inquiry has shifted from the question of whether making and using the
invention requires undue experimentation to whether such experimentation is required to define the “full scope” of the invention by figuring
out which of all the possible species within the genus work for the invention’s claimed purpose. Counterintuitively, it may now be better to
draft broader composition claims with no functional limitations so as to
forestall arguments about how numerous “variables would or would not
impact the functionality” of the claimed invention. 247 But even that
won’t necessarily help if the claims don’t make clear exactly what the
working chemicals are or if it takes a long time to make every single
chemical within the genus.
Worse yet, the “routine but undue” theory makes it much easier for
defendants to argue that genus claims are overbroad on their face. Genus claims now fail enablement even when the inventor isn’t using the
scope of the claim to effectively lock up a scientific discovery like antisense or technology in a nascent field like the use of recombinant
DNA for EPO synthesis. 248 This development calls into question any
genus claim covering a significant number of species in the life sciences
and chemical fields because they typically come with built-in unpredictability even when the claimed technology is mature. Accordingly,
examples of claims surviving enablement challenges on appeal are becoming increasingly rare.
B. Written Description and the Possession of Genus Claims
The shift in enablement law we described in the previous Section
is bad enough for chemical patentees. But there’s more. The written
description requirement, also drawn from § 112(a), has in the last thirty
years morphed from a fairly limited tool for preventing the inventor
246. See, e.g., Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d
1167, 1186 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
247. Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
248. Merges & Nelson, supra note 13, at 904–08 (discussing problems with allowing broad
patents on “science-based” inventions); see also generally Canady, supra note 151.
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from adding or amending claims after the filing date 249 to a powerful
check on claim scope. 250
As we show in this Section, the heightened enablement requirement and the new, broader written description doctrine have reinforced
one another so as to turn § 112(a) into an extremely powerful weapon
against generic claiming in the life sciences. Although the new written
description requirement appears to be concerned mainly with premature patenting (or “gun jumping”), it has expanded to invalidate originally filed generic claims as well as those added or amended during
prosecution. Finally, as with enablement, therapeutic efficacy limitations can create special written description problems for the patentee.251
1. Lilly and Written Description as Enablement Plus
As we noted in Part II, the focus of the original version of the written description requirement was on claims introduced after the filing
date. To review earlier discussion, 252 if the patent describes (and even
claims) only an individual chemical species A and does not include any
broadening language, an attempt to add a new generic claim X during
prosecution will run into a written description problem. 253 Thus, even
if the PHOSITA would have no trouble extrapolating from the teachings for making A to synthesize numerous other species (B, C, D) that
fall within genus X without undue experimentation, the patent’s failure
to indicate that the method for making A is generalizable can be fatal
to claiming X. 254 A court or the USPTO would say that the PHOSITA
reading the original filing would conclude that the inventors were not
“in possession” of the genus — they didn’t appreciate that the synthesis
of A readily generalized to other species (B, C, D) and ultimately to
X. 255 This example illustrates that a generic claim can be enabled, but
not described.
One way an inventor could solve the problem, it would seem, is by
including a claim to X as part of the original patent filing, because a
249. See supra Section II.C.1.
250. For early commentary on the shift, see Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure
Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–88 (2000); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving
Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633–49 (1998); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description
Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222–26 (1998).
251. See Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
Nuvo Pharms. (Ir.) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys Inc., 923 F.3d 1368, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
252. See supra Section II.C.1.
253. See supra notes 116–124 and accompanying text.
254. Id.
255. See generally Jules E. Goldberg, Genus, Species, and the Patent Law, 53 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 73 (1971) (discussing the failures of genus claims that were not supported by enough
species in the patent’s specification).
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genus claim should indicate to the PHOSITA that the inventors possessed the genus. Before the 1990s, patent attorneys would deploy that
very strategy and were probably safe in assuming that any genus
claimed at the time of filing was also possessed, satisfying the written
description requirement. 256 That changed, however, with Regents of the
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 257 a case that created a significant new route for policing the scope of genus claims (among other
impacts).
In Lilly, the patentee described the structure of a “complementary”
DNA (“cDNA”) that encodes insulin in the rat, and attempted to extrapolate from this discovery to the cDNAs for insulin in any mammal. 258 The practical implications are worth appreciating here: no one
really cared about rat cDNA for its own sake, but rather because the
commercially valuable use of the invention was to produce insulin in
other mammals — particularly, humans — the inventors included a generic mammalian claim in their original patent filing. 259
The reader may recall the foregoing discussion of Amgen and conclude that this claim at least had an enablement problem — only one
species of DNA is disclosed, and a large number (the whole mammalian kingdom!) is claimed. 260 However, as much as we humans might
not like it, there can be significant homology (i.e., similarity) between
the corresponding genes of rats and humans. 261 And if the methodology
for isolating rat insulin cDNA readily translates to cDNAs coding for
insulin in humans and other mammals, we have the very scenario discussed in the previous paragraph: the making of A (rat insulin cDNA)
can be extrapolated to B (human), C (non-human primate), and D (dolphin), and the genus X (mammalian insulin cDNA) is enabled. 262
But in Lilly, the Federal Circuit didn’t reach the enablement question at all. Instead, it invalidated the mammalian insulin cDNA claim
for inadequate written description, rejecting the argument that its inclusion in the original filing showed the inventors’ rat work was generalizable to other mammals like humans. 263
256. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 161–63
(2006).
257. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
258. Id. at 1563. Another claim covered the genus of vertebrates. Id. at 1567–68.
259. Id. at 1562–63.
260. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213–14 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
261. Andy Coghlan, Rat Genome Reveals Supercharged Evolution, NEWSCIENTIST (Mar.
31, 2004), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4840-rat-genome-reveals-superchargedevolution/ [https://perma.cc/8C4J-5T6R] (“Even today, [humans, rats, and mice] share 280
large chunks of chromosomes that are virtually identical, suggesting that they are indispensable.”); Claude Szpirer, Rat Models of Human Diseases and Related Phenotypes: A Systematic
Inventory of the Causative Genes, 27 J. BIOMED. SCI. 84, at 2 (2020) (noting that “a considerable number of conserved genes have similar effects on biological traits in rats and humans”).
262. See Sampson, supra note 150, at 1260–61 (suggesting this possibility).
263. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568–69.
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How could there be a written description problem when the originally filed claim itself contained the genus claim? Proceeding from the
starting point that a DNA is at bottom a chemical compound, the court
explained that there can be no possession of the DNA without
knowledge of its “sequence,” or chemical structure. The court noted
that “a generic statement such as . . . ‘mammalian insulin cDNA,’ without more, isn’t an adequate written description of the genus because it
doesn’t distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function,”
or “define any structural features commonly possessed by members of
the genus that distinguish them from others.” 264 In so doing, the Federal
Circuit rejected the view that the written description requirement is
used to police only priority of invention (i.e., introduction of claims
after filing, narrow or broad, that are not supported by the specification), 265 as opposed to early patenting or claim scope. 266
The University of California inventors were thus left with an essentially worthless claim to the rat insulin cDNA. 267 And inventors
more generally were left with a problem: they had to provide “‘a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula, [or] chemical name,’ of the
claimed subject matter sufficient to distinguish it from other materials” 268 in order to describe a genus claim, even if the PHOSITA could
figure out what was in the genus and how to use it without undue experimentation.
Lilly quite clearly rested on the Federal Circuit’s policy judgment
that the inventors filed their patent application too soon in the research
process by trying to lay claim to human insulin cDNA before determining its structure. The court said as much when it noted that the specification and claims were directed only to “a mere wish or plan for
obtaining the claimed chemical invention.” 269 The court also invalidated the narrow claim to human insulin DNA, which is evidence that
Lilly was more about filing too early than claiming too broadly. 270 For
both the human species and the mammalian genus claims, the Federal
Circuit took issue with the lack of information about the structure of
insulin cDNAs of organisms other than the rat. Nonetheless, as we discuss below, Lilly has had a lasting impact on more traditional (i.e., nonfunctional) genus claims too.

264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
266. See Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology at the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 441, 451–53 (2004).
267. See Karen G. Potter, Getting Written Description Right in the Biotechnology Arts: A
Realist Approach to Patent Scope, 28 BIOTECH. L. REP. 1, 6, 14 (2009).
268. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568 (first quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), and then citing In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
269. Id. at 1566 (citing Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171).
270. See id. at 1567.
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The Lilly court’s efforts to square its policy focus on early patenting with the distinct problem of generic claiming, as well as its struggle
to distinguish how genus claims are analyzed under the enablement versus written description prongs of § 112(a), presage the doctrinal drift
that is now making genus claims practically impossible to defend in
court. The Federal Circuit created a second way of opposing genus
claims that is similar to an enablement challenge, 271 but it did not explain precisely how the process of proper extrapolation from species to
genus differs for written description. 272 We do know that unlike traditional enablement doctrine, post-Lilly written description doesn’t require addressing undue experimentation. A generic claim may well be
enabled based on the PHOSITA’s ability to readily make multiple species, but not described — even if the inventor attempts to show the genus’s possession by claiming it in the original filing or using
broadening language. 273
The Lilly opinion also reveals an important dynamic in the Federal
Circuit’s use of § 112(a) as a policy tool. Indeed, some commentators
have explicitly called Lilly written description “super-enablement” or
“enablement plus,” suggesting that it creates an extra hurdle for biotechnological inventions. 274 That extra hurdle can’t be satisfied by
showing, for instance, that the PHOSITA can make and use human insulin cDNA without undue experimentation.
The Federal Circuit’s overarching desire to prevent patentees from
jumping the gun and locking up nascent technology may explain its
willingness to dispense with considering certain Wands factors, as in
some enablement cases like Amgen, 275 or even all of them, as in written
description decisions and particularly those involving functional claims
like those in Lilly. One way or another, the court concluded, the claims
in Amgen and Lilly had to be invalid, and the new tests it introduced
ensured the court’s ability to reach the results it believed to be correct
on policy grounds. But the court never explicitly tied these opinions to
concerns with early patenting, which meant that Amgen and Lilly could
henceforth be used against genus claims directed to relatively mature
generically claimed inventions, not just nascent ones. Thus, the Federal
271. Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4, 17, 78–80 (2007); see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers
in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1653–54 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy
Levers].
272. See Guang Ming Whitley, Note, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: The “Extended”
Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 623–24 (2004).
273. See supra notes 117–124 and accompanying text.
274. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 271, at 1653; Holman, supra note 271,
at 4.
275. See Kellam, supra note 190, at 227–29; see also Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk
A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (failing to credit the level of skill in the art in the
Wands analysis).

40

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 35

Circuit’s approach has eroded doctrinal stability: the focus of enablement shifted from targeting “unknown unknowns” to “known unknowns,” 276 and written description expanded so as to endanger genus
claims that have not presented significant gun-jumping or late-claiming
concerns.
These doctrinal shortcuts are worth exploring because their effects
on § 112(a)’s many functions are crucial to understanding the origins
of the Federal Circuit’s current attitude toward — really, against — genus claiming. To be clear, the written description requirement continues
to play multiple discrete, and rather different, roles. It polices priority,
and after Lilly, it also prevents gun jumping and functional claiming.
But today, it also significantly limits claim scope.
2. Entrenchment and Growth as a Weapon Against Genus Claims
a. The Ariad Case
Written description is not going away. Controversy over this requirement 277 prompted the Federal Circuit to convene en banc in Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 278 In Ariad, the court reaffirmed both that the written description requirement was separate from
enablement and that it could apply to originally filed claims. 279 But
while the court reached a result that we believe to be correct given the
facts of the case, it further contributed to the undeserved demise of biotechnology and chemical genus claims.
Similar to Lilly, the claim at issue in Ariad was drafted in functional
terms. But the Federal Circuit’s analysis of Ariad’s patents reveals a
subtle interplay of distinct policy concerns with overbreadth, functional
language, and timing. The court observed that the claim at issue was
broad and reaffirmed Lilly when it stated that the patent as a whole must
“demonstrate[ ] that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus.” 280 The court found written description problems “especially acute with genus claims that use functional language
to define the boundaries of a claimed genus.” 281 This language suggests
276. See supra Section III.A.2.
277. See generally, e.g., Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373,
1376–81 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.,
dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc); Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1307–25 (Rader,
J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc) (providing an appendix summarizing
academic commentary and debate over written description); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. GenProbe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976–83 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from the order denying rehearing en banc).
278. 598 F.3d 1336, 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
279. Id. at 1358.
280. Id. at 1349.
281. Id.
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that the court approaches functional claiming as somewhat of a heuristic that may signal a written description problem. 282
As a factual matter, there were plenty of reasons to reject Ariad’s
claim, which the court described as directed to a “research hypothes[i]s” and “an unfinished invention.” 283 The overarching issue
was that the inventors didn’t sufficiently disclose any chemicals that
could accomplish the claimed function, for the simple reason that they
hadn’t actually discovered or tested any such chemicals. 284 Ultimately,
in invalidating the claims, the Federal Circuit reiterated that the claims
had problems with breadth, functionality, and timing. 285 But it wasn’t
apparent whether all the reasons for holding the claims invalid meant
that the result in Ariad was overdetermined, 286 and the opinion never
made it clear which rationale was particularly critical to its decision. 287
Some parsing would have been useful, however. Claims can be
broad, but neither early nor functional (many chemical genus claims);
narrow, early, and functional (the human insulin cDNA claim in Lilly);
broad, functional, but not early (as when the invention is “finished” but
the patent attorney still chooses to claim it by function); and so on.
Consistent with the history of the written description requirement, the
policy concern animating the opinion appeared to be timing — in that
a purely functional claim suggests that the inventor has jumped the gun
and filed the application too soon. Specifically, the Ariad court stated
near the conclusion of its exposition of the law that “[r]equiring a written description of the invention limits patent protection to those who
actually perform the difficult work of ‘invention . . . .’” 288 Nevertheless, the doctrinal analysis wasn’t explicitly so cabined. Perhaps any
one of the three potential problems — of function, timing, or breadth —
would have doomed the claims, or perhaps the problem was their combination. As a doctrinal matter, the court’s lack of clarity on this score
was significant: it created openings for multiple distinct lines of written
description attacks, which have been pursued with great success against
genus claims in subsequent cases.

282. For straightforward examples of purely functional claims invalidated for lack of adequate written description, see AbbVie Deutschland GmbH v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d
1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 917
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
283. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353.
284. Id. at 1356–68.
285. Id. at 1358.
286. Cf. Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 127, 139–42 (2010) (arguing that the written description requirement doesn’t
necessarily prohibit broad claims).
287. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1354–58.
288. Id. at 1353.
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b. Further Impact on Genus Claims
Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, which relied heavily on Ariad, illustrates the dynamics of written description as a weapon
against genus claims. 289 The technology is familiar from Wyeth, discussed above in the enablement Section: it involved the clearing of arterial plaque with stents while mitigating the dangerous hardening of
the arteries, or “restenosis.” 290 Unlike the method claims in Wyeth, the
patents at issue in Boston Scientific were directed to stent devices covered with therapeutic agents. 291 Similar to Wyeth, however, the specifications in Boston Scientific were focused on one therapeutic species,
sirolimus, but the patents broadly claimed various macrocyclic analogs
of the rapamycin genus. 292 But instead of invalidating the claims for
lack of enablement as in Wyeth, the court relied on written description
to do so. 293
But the Federal Circuit’s problem with the claims in Boston Scientific was very different from that in the key written description precedents just discussed. Unlike Lilly or Ariad, the inventors in Boston
Scientific hardly jumped the gun to patent a mere “research hypothesis.” In contrast to the dearth of chemical information for human insulin
DNA in Lilly, the PHOSITA could readily “visualize or recognize” 294
the structures of the various rapamycin macrocycles, for they are “tangible things” that lend themselves to description. 295 In addition, the Ariad inventors claimed every chemical under the sun that could
accomplish a particular biological function without providing any examples of such chemicals, or really any structural information at all. In
contrast, the inventors in Boston Scientific actually reduced the invention to practice (i.e., created a working embodiment), getting antirestenosis to work on a stent with a molecule falling within the claimed
genus. 296 Nevertheless, as the Federal Circuit saw it, the claims still had
an overbreadth problem. 297 Even though the claims were drafted in
structural rather than functional terms, they still failed for lack of adequate written description.
289. Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1363–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
290. Id. at 1356; Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The
two cases, however, dealt with patents of somewhat different scope and the court used slightly
different terminology in naming the genuses.
291. Bos. Sci., 647 F.3d at 1357–58.
292. Id. at 1358–60.
293. Id. at 1367–69.
294. Id. at 1363.
295. Jacob S. Sherkow, Describing Drugs: A Response to Professors Allison and Ouellette,
65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 127, 131 (2016).
296. Bos. Sci., 647 F.3d at 1364.
297. Thus, invalidating one group of claims under review, the court explained that “[w]hile
a small number of [sirolimus] analogs were known in the prior art, the claims cover tens of
thousands of possible macrocyclic lactone analogs.” Id. at 1365.
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The Boston Scientific court did discuss function, but in a very different sense from Lilly and Ariad, which involved claims that were
wholly devoid of chemical structure. It explained that “there is insufficient correlation between the function and structure of [sirolimus] and
its analogs to provide adequate written description support for the entire
genus of macrocyclic lactone analogs of rapamycin.” 298 As in Wyeth,
an enablement case, the Federal Circuit in Boston Scientific thus found
it significant that the inventors lacked the knowledge of how structural
modifications of the rapamycin core would affect antirestenotic properties.
But the effect of structural changes in chemical compounds on therapeutic efficacy can rarely be predicted ex ante, 299 so it’s really unclear
how much more the patentee could have done if it wanted to claim its
antirestenosis invention as a chemical genus. Indeed, as Jake Sherkow
observes, “drug composition claims may allow so much variability . . .
as to make the written-description requirement virtually impossible.”300
In Wyeth, the court at least relied on an undisputed factual assertion that
synthesizing and testing the members of the structural genus for antirestenotic activity would take a long time when it concluded that the
claims were nonenabled. 301 But in Boston Scientific, the court didn’t
even do that. It invalidated the claims for lack of “possession” of the
genus because a link between structure and properties was missing. 302
The patentee knew what the genus was and how some embodiments
worked. But even if the genus were enabled, which is an issue the Federal Circuit didn’t reach, the patentee still failed to adequately describe
the invention because it didn’t give a complete map of which structures
performed the desired function. The genus claim simply had no chance.
Idenix Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 303 discussed
above in the enablement Section, also relied on written description as
an alternative ground to invalidate the claims directed to a method of
treating the hepatitis C virus with a class of compounds having a
furanosyl nucleoside core. 304 In that part of the opinion, the court focused on the defendant’s infringing product, which had a fluorine substituent on the core nucleoside ring in the so-called “2’-down”
position. 305 Indeed, species with the 2’-fluoro-down substituent played
a critical role in the Federal Circuit’s decision that the genus was not
298. Id. at 1366.
299. See, e.g., Hendra Wahyudi & Shelli R. McAlpine, Predicting the Unpredictable: Recent Structure-Activity Studies on Peptide-Based Macrocycles, 60 BIOORGANIC CHEM. 74
(2015).
300. Sherkow, supra note 295, at 131.
301. Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
302. Bos. Sci., 647 F.3d at 1364.
303. 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
304. Id. at 1153, 1155.
305. Id. at 1155.
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adequately described because the court framed the validity inquiry in
terms of “whether the specification demonstrates possession of the [fluorine-substituted] nucleosides that are the basis for [defendant’s] accused product.” 306 The Federal Circuit, in sum, invalidated the claims
under written description because a particular set of working species
made by the defendant was not specifically called out in the patent,
even though the specification taught the PHOSITA how to make structurally analogous molecules and even to test whether varying the structures produced molecules that worked.
The court’s methodology is notable. The patent listed numerous
examples of compounds falling within the scope of the generic structure and having the claimed therapeutic property of treating HCV, 307
but the accused fluorine-substituted product wasn’t mentioned. Seizing
on this point, the court noted several times that the specification’s failure to recite this material or other fluorine-based derivatives at the 2’down position was “conspicuous[],” 308 even though fluorine may not
warrant explicit mention because it’s a common substituent that can be
readily visualized by the PHOSITA. In doing so, the court effectively
punished the patentee for providing too many representative examples,
noting that the various formulas listed in the specification included numerous substitution patterns except for the 2’-fluoro-down. 309
The absence of this set of species doomed the entire genus under
the written description requirement both for reasons of structure and
function. The Federal Circuit concluded that the patent “fails to provide
sufficient blaze marks to direct a [PHOSITA] to the specific subset of
2’-methyl-up nucleosides that are effective in treating HCV.” 310 It further explained that, despite the disclosed working examples, “[t]he
specification . . . provides no method of distinguishing effective from
ineffective compounds for the compounds reaching beyond the formulas disclosed in the ’597 patent.” 311 But in unpredictable life sciences
arts there often is no “method” other than trial and error. 312 As suggested above, a tiny structural change can lead to massive therapeutic
differences, so the patentee can often provide no “blaze marks” 313 other
than by conducting experiments on as many species as possible. Here,
306. Id. at 1163–64.
307. Id. at 1161.
308. Id. at 1165.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1164.
311. Id.
312. See sources cited supra note 190; Patent & Trademark Office Society, Statement of
the P.T.O.S. to the U.S.P.T.O. on Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, First Paragraph “Written Description” Requirement, 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 140, 142 (1999) (recognizing “highly unpredictable areas in biotechnology . . . where results at each step do not follow as anticipated, but are achieved empirically by what amounts to trial and error”).
313. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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the patentee did just that. But because it didn’t specifically list the 2’fluro-down subgenus, the claim was invalidated for lack of written description. 314
Idenix is particularly notable because it doesn’t map to any of the
justifications for the written description doctrine. The claim wasn’t
drafted in purely functional terms; the patentees didn’t jump the gun
because the invention was reduced to practice and numerous working
examples were provided; and the genus, though broad, was supported
by several species, 315 and not just one, as in Boston Scientific. But the
claim failed written description because the defendant’s compound
wasn’t specifically listed among the identified working examples. 316 As
a result, even if the PHOSITA could synthesize and test the claim’s
various species so rapidly that experimentation to select the operative
embodiments was facile enough to pass enablement, the claim
would’ve still been invalid. The inventors’ only option for keeping the
broad claim, it seems, was to make and test nearly every possible species. Even then, their claim would seemingly be invalid under Idenix as
long as the defendant came up with an unlisted species that worked.
That turns the law of genus claims on its head. 317
*

*

*

*

*

The combination of enablement and written description has proven
particularly difficult for patentees to overcome. 318 It is, of course, not
unusual for a judgment to be reachable on two or more alternative
grounds. But the now close similarity between written description and
enablement as tools for challenging genus claims essentially allows defendants to characterize various pieces of evidence (disclosures in the
specification, the state of the art, expert testimony) in such a way as to
take two shots at the claims in the hope that one of them sticks. Often,
they do: for example, even if the plaintiff introduces enough testimony
on the Wands factors to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
undue experimentation, the court can sidestep that testimony by looking on the face of the patent and holding that the written description

314. Cf. Pitlick, supra note 250, at 221–22 (predicting this outcome in his analysis of Lilly).
315. See supra notes 232–234 and accompanying text.
316. See Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1164–65.
317. Of course, another approach was to claim only a narrow subgenus of the species that
worked and avoid generalizing altogether. But that defeats the whole purpose of genus claiming as a way of creating meaningful patent protection beyond the working embodiments in
the specification.
318. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY &
THE COMMON LAW 504, 506–08 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed. 2013) (explaining how the
multiplying number of ways that defendants can attack a patent can help them avoid liability).
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fails because it does not show “possession.” 319 We have seen the converse as well: a claim that survived a written description challenge on
remand, in spite of the Federal Circuit’s strong suggestion that it was
invalid under this requirement, 320 still failed enablement. 321 As weapons against genus claims, enablement and written description make for
a powerful combination both procedurally and substantively.
C. Claims Surviving § 112(a) Challenges
The cases we have highlighted so far in this Part are just a sampling
of the Federal Circuit’s rejection of genus claims. There are many more
appellate decisions after 1990 striking down genus claims for lack of
enablement, written description, or both, often overturning the district
court or a jury verdict in the process. 322 These cases illustrate a consistent pattern of genus claim failure. There are only a few post-1990
exceptions, and we think they actually prove the rule that such claims
usually have no chance at the Federal Circuit. Each comes with a special (and limited) circumstance. 323
One notable category of appeals in which genus claims were sometimes upheld against § 112(a) challenges involved interferences, which
319. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(claim can satisfy enablement but still fail written description); compare Bos. Sci. Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1361–69 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that since the
patent at issue was invalid for lack of written description, there was no need to separately
address enablement), with Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(using lack of enablement to invalidate patents similar to those in Boston Scientific).
320. See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1375–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (determining that
the test embodied in the district court’s jury instruction on the written description requirement
was improper because it “allows patentees to claim antibodies by describing something that
is not the invention, i.e., the antigen”).
321. On remand, the properly instructed jury still found adequate written description (and
enablement). See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 987 F.3d 1080, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2021). However, on
appeal from the decision on remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment as a matter of
law that the patents were nonenabled (without reaching written description). See id. at 1084–
88.
322. See, e.g., Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2021); Nuvo Pharms. (Ir.) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys Inc., 923 F.3d 1368,
1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019); AbbVie Deutschland GmbH v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Bioscis. APS, 723 F.3d 1336,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 636 F.3d 1341, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2011); In re ’318 Pat. Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1323–27 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1019–22 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. HoffmannLa Roche, Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1335–
36 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Noelle
v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1348–53 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk,
A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
323. There are also cases in which genus claims prevailed where the defendants didn’t raise
full-scope enablement or written description arguments. We don’t include them in our analysis here, though we discuss their significance infra Part IV.
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are now-obsolete adversarial USPTO proceedings for resolving who
among two or more competing inventors, or groups of inventors, came
up with the claimed subject matter first. 324 Interferences are a special
case, and the Federal Circuit’s interference decisions have had a limited
impact on the court’s § 112(a) jurisprudence more generally.
The remaining few cases we identified in which generic claims survived enablement or written description attacks on appeal can be classified into claims directed to a relatively small genus; challenges to the
breadth of limitations directed to claim features that are already wellknown and are not the invention’s focus; and other outlier examples
that feature unusual genus claims, defendant failures to offer factual
support for their invalidity assertions, or combinations of some of these
characteristics. We believe that these cases, which we consider below
in turn, are thus of limited practical significance for the validity of traditional genus claims.
1. Interferences
An interference proceeding is a “priority contest” between two or
more parties. 325 Although the standards for enablement and written description in interferences are congruent with those in appeals from
USPTO rejections or district court judgments, the ultimate question is
which of the parties in a race to be the first to patent the invention is
entitled to priority. 326 As a result, an interference proceeding typically
ends with someone’s claims getting upheld as the earlier of the two inventors. 327 Neither party to an interference has an incentive to argue
that no one can have a claim that broad. Instead, their arguments tend
to focus on more traditional timing issues around written description —
did the alleged first inventor jump the gun by filing too early?
Perhaps because an interference must usually result in a winner,
§ 112(a)’s requirements may be applied in a manner more friendly to
genus claims than in other types of appeals. One example is Singh v.
Brake, 328 in which the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO’s grant of
priority to an inventor of a “DNA construct” claim, deferring to the
324. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012). A few interferences involving patents not subject to
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 288 (2011),
are currently in progress, but the number of such patents is dwindling and interferences will
thus completely disappear with the passage of time. See Gene Quinn, Reform Doing Away
with Interference Proceedings & First to Invent, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 26, 2010),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/03/26/reform-doing-away-with-interferenceproceedings-first-to-invent [https://perma.cc/UE6P-BHFL]; infra note 423 and accompanying text.
325. Brown v. Barbacid, 276 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., id.
328. 317 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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agency’s conclusion that it was adequately described and enabled.329
The § 112(a) discussion in Singh has only been cited in one other precedential Federal Circuit opinion, and only for the basic proposition that
“the written description requirement . . . is a question of fact, reviewed
for substantial evidence.” 330 By contrast, some of the cases striking
down genus claims (e.g., Calgene and Lilly) have been cited numerous
times for substantive propositions in subsequent Federal Circuit opinions. 331
Another pro-patentee result in an interference appeal — which,
however, does not follow the usual pattern of someone being declared
a winner — is Capon v. Eshhar. 332 This case, similar to Regents of the
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 involved claims directed
to DNAs for which structural information was lacking. 334 Oddly
enough, the parties ended up on the same side of the appeal after the
USPTO concluded sua sponte that neither set of claims was adequately
described. 335 The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that
the USPTO “erred in ruling that § 112 imposes a per se rule requiring
recitation in the specification of the nucleotide sequence of claimed
DNA, when that sequence is already known in the field.” 336 Capon was
followed in another Federal Circuit interference appeal 337 and cited for
basic propositions in other cases. 338 Capon, however, has been consistently distinguished in non-interference written description cases involving the validity of genus claims, including Ariad and Boston
Scientific. 339 More telling, the Federal Circuit even distinguished Capon in another written description case involving DNA, Carnegie
Mellon University v. Hoffman-La Roche, 340 in which the court followed
329. Id. at 1343–46.
330. Bilstad v. Wakapoulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
331. Enzo v. Calgene is cited in, e.g., Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d
1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013); ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch., 346 F.3d 1051, 1054–
57 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Ariad v. Eli Lilly is cited in, e.g., Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma,
Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1335–42 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941
F.3d 1149, 1163–65 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353,
1361–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
332. 418 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
333. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
334. Capon, 418 F.3d at 1349.
335. Id. at 1350.
336. Id. at 1360–61; cf. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (arguably creating just such a per se rule
outside the interference context).
337. Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
338. In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Goeddel v. Sugano,
617 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
339. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc);
Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Juno
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (distinguishing Capon and invalidating the claims for lack of adequate written description).
340. 541 F.3d 1115, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. instead and
invalidated the claims at issue. 341 In sum, Capon has not had a lasting
influence at the Federal Circuit.
2. Small Genuses and Genuses Known Prior to the Invention
A second set of patents that survive § 112(a) challenges at the Federal Circuit involve small genuses and genuses that are already fully
understood in the prior art. In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova,
Inc., 342 for example, the claims were directed to a process of extracting
fatty acids from certain kinds of fish. 343 The defendants introduced evidence of nonenablement of the patent’s broad independent claim, but
“failed to present any evidence . . . that one of ordinary skill in the art
must perform undue experimentation” to practice the narrower dependent claims. 344 Moreover, at trial, an expert opined that these dependent
claims encompassed only 22 biological species, a far cry from the
10,000-plus species encompassed in the main claim. 345 The Federal
Circuit took this statement to “support[] an inference that there are relatively few potential species that may meet the limitations of” these
claims. 346 The court thus upheld the claims, but as with Singh, future
Federal Circuit panels have relied on Martek only for neutral propositions. 347
The written description challenge in the recent Ajinomoto Co. v.
International Trade Commission 348 decision failed for a different reason — it was lodged at a genus that was well-known prior to the invention at issue. 349 The asserted claims were directed to cultivating E. coli
341. Id. at 1124–27.
342. 579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
343. Id. at 1367.
344. Id. at 1379.
345. Id.
346. Id. To similar effect is Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 745 F.3d 1180
(Fed. Cir. 2014). In Alcon, the Federal Circuit overturned invalidations on both enablement
and written description grounds. While the case was presented as a full-scope enablement
case, the court concluded that while there were many different possible variants of the claim,
the PHOSITA would understand that they all worked as intended and claimed and varied only
in efficacy. Id. at 1189. It found the claims valid “because Barr did not show that any claimed
embodiments would be inoperable and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
been unable to practice the asserted claims without resorting to any experimentation, let alone
undue experimentation . . . .” Id. at 1190. The claims likewise survived a written description
attack. Id. at 1191–92.
347. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc.,
699 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Martek for the proposition that enablement is a
question of law based on underlying facts, resulting in plenary review of the former and substantial evidence review of the latter).
348. 932 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
349. Id. at 1359; see also Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 980–82
(Fed. Cir. 2021) (upholding patent against an enablement challenge where the genus at issue
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bacteria to produce an essential amino acid “by replacing the native
promoter which precedes the DNA on the chromosome of the bacterium with a more potent promoter . . . .” 350 The invalidity arguments
were focused on the “more potent promoter” limitation. 351 Yet, the focus of the invention was not the promoters at all, but rather the discovery of the gene whose modification with a promoter boosted the amino
acid production. 352 As for the promoters themselves, “the genus of
more potent promoters was already well explored in the relevant art”
and the specification mentioned several of them. 353 The Federal Circuit
determined that the patentee sufficiently supported the genus by including in the “specification, read in light of the background knowledge in
the art, a representative number of species for the genus of more potent
promoters.” 354 The court also distinguished Lilly and Boston Scientific
and concluded that the art’s familiarity with more potent promoters
meant that the common structural features of the genus were also adequately described. 355 Thus, “a skilled artisan could make relatively predictable changes to the native promoter to arrive at a more potent
promoter” and the claims survived § 112(a). 356
3. Other Cases
We have found only two more Federal Circuit opinions upholding
genus claims in the past thirty years. Both decisions were made for reasons that aren’t easy to classify precisely, but that we believe are unusual. In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., 357 the claims
in suit were directed to a so-called “reverse transcriptase” (“RT”), an
enzyme involved in DNA replication. 358 In its enablement challenge,
the defendant complained that the specification failed to describe all the
possible methods of making the enzyme. 359 This argument was unsuccessful: while the universe of methods for making a particular composition might be described as a kind of genus, 360 in practice the Federal
Circuit has consistently treated claims directed to “a genus of methods”
was not the inventive part of the patent); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (holding that use of well-known promoters was enabled). But cf. Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (invalidating a claim for
lack of adequate written description even given a well-known genus).
350. Ajinomoto, 932 F.3d at 1347.
351. Id. at 1358–59.
352. Id. at 1359.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1360–61.
356. Id. at 1361.
357. 429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
358. Id. at 1058.
359. Id. at 1070.
360. Karshtedt, Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions, supra note 152, at 130–33.

No. 1]

The Death of the Genus Claim

51

differently — and apparently much more leniently — than claims to a
traditional structural genus. 361 In this context, “the enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode of making and using
the invention” and the one method for making the enzyme disclosed in
the specification was sufficient under this rule. 362
The defendant also challenged the written description of a specific
group of RT claims, which were drafted in functional terms to recite
“[a]n isolated polypeptide . . . having substantially reduced RNase H
activity,” but that argument also failed. 363 The defendant argued that
the “DNA or protein sequences” of the enzyme were not recited, but
the Federal Circuit retorted that this argument “proceeds from a factual
premise contrary to the record.” 364 Instead, as the court noted, the specification “recite[d] both the DNA and amino acid sequences of a representative embodiment of the claimed RT enzyme” and “disclose[d] test
data that the enzyme produced by the listed sequence has the claimed
features — DNA polymerase activity without RNase H activity.” 365
While it is not entirely clear what the genus size was, the defendant
never made an overbreadth argument. 366 In any event, Invitrogen —
like the other cases discussed in this Section — has had limited impact
on the development of the Federal Circuit’s law of enablement, and has
been cited only for uncontroversial general propositions of law. 367
We finally come to the complex opinion in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 368 in which a split Federal Circuit panel affirmed
the bench trial judgment that the claims at issue were adequately described and enabled. 369 A representative claim recited “[a] pharmaceutical composition comprising a therapeutically effective amount of
human erythropoietin . . . , wherein said erythropoietin is purified from
361. Cf. Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the
New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3; Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising
Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1093–94 (2009); Timothy Chen Saulsbury, Note, Pioneers
Versus Improvers: Enabling Optimal Claim Scope, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
439, 443, 448–52, 463 (2010).
362. Invitrogen, 429 F.3d at 1071 (emphasis added) (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also Jason Rantanen, The Doctrinal
Structure of Patent Law’s Enablement Requirement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1681–84 (2016)
(discussing various strategies for attacking patent claims on overbreadth grounds).
363. Invitrogen, 429 F.3d at 1074.
364. Id. at 1073.
365. Id.
366. The defendant’s failure to make an overbreadth argument, as made possible by Federal Circuit opinions like Idenix, might explain some examples of cases in which genus claims
have survived district court proceedings. See infra Section IV.A (discussing the contours of
“full-scope” enablement).
367. See, e.g., In re ’318 Pat. Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing Invitrogen only for the well-established proposition that enablement is a question of
law).
368. 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This is a different Amgen case than the one discussed
above and we refer to it as “Hoechst.”
369. Id. at 1313.
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mammalian cells grown in culture.” 370 After “commend[ing] the district court for its thorough, careful, and precise work on what is indubitably a legally difficult and technologically complex case,” the majority
deferred heavily to the lower court’s fact findings. 371 The court also
noted that the trial judge had in turn heavily emphasized the clear and
convincing standard required to prove invalidity and had concluded that
the defendant did not meet this burden. 372
One of the issues in Hoechst was whether the “mammalian” limitation made the claim overbroad. Emphasizing that compliance with the
written description requirement is a question of fact reviewed for clear
error after a bench trial, the Federal Circuit noted that “the district court
carefully examined whether [the] specification adequately described
the full breadth of the claims” 373 and concluded that the defendant
failed to overcome the presumption of validity. 374 Indeed, the lower
“court weighed the testimony and found that the evidence showed that
the descriptions adequately described to [the PHOSITA at the time of
filing] the use of the broad class of available mammalian and vertebrate
cells to produce the claimed high levels of human EPO in culture.” 375
The Federal Circuit found no error, explaining that cases like Lilly were
distinguishable because the claim in Hoechst was not directed to DNA
but rather to the mammalian genus itself as the source of EPO, and there
was no doubt what animals fit in the genus “mammal.” 376 The word
“mammalian,” the court noted, “readily ‘convey[ed] distinguishing information concerning [the genus’s] identity’ such that one of ordinary
skill in the art could ‘visualize or recognize the identity of the members
of the genus.’” 377
The defendant fared no better on enablement, with the Federal Circuit noting that “the district court made thorough and complete factual
findings supporting its holding that the claims were not proven not enabled.” 378 One of the findings was that the method of production of
EPO generalizes readily from the two mammals for which it was actually done to all other mammals: “[T]he [trial] court accepted testimony
indicating that [the PHOSITA] would infer from the [representative]
cell examples that similar outcomes could be expected from other
mammalian cells since all mammalian cells produce and secrete

370. Id. at 1323.
371. Id. at 1320.
372. Id. at 1331, 1339.
373. Id. at 1330–31.
374. Id. at 1339.
375. Id. at 1331.
376. Id. at 1332.
377. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567–68
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
378. Id. at 1334–35.
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hormones like EPO by means of the same fundamental processes.” 379
After noting that “[t]hese are all findings of fact and they have not been
shown to be clearly erroneous,” the majority upheld the claims. 380
In dissent, Judge Raymond Clevenger wryly noted that “[w]hile I
share my colleagues’ admiration for the considerable efforts of the district court in this complicated case, I cannot share their faith that the
district court properly and conscientiously applied” Federal Circuit
precedent. 381 The dissent’s main concern was that the panel majority
misapplied § 112(a) law to “source and process” limitations of the
claims, such as “mammalian.” However, such limitations don’t often
come up in genus claiming, so the scope of this holding is inherently
narrow. 382 As such, this case also had limited impact. 383
Hoechst is the opinion that looks most like the § 112(a) jurisprudence of old, which was much more accepting of genus claims. But it
is nearly 20 years old, drew a dissent, and has not been used to justify
broad claims in the decades since the case was decided.
*

*

*

*

*

The path of the law is messy. And particularly so when courts are
moving the law in new directions, as they are with enablement and written description. But while the case law isn’t unanimous, the outlier
opinions discussed in this Section do not detract from the conclusion
that the Federal Circuit’s primary approach to traditional genus claims
in chemical and biological sciences has become increasingly hostile.
Indeed, the anomalous cases in this Section presented features such as
an unusual procedural posture (indeed, for interference appeals, one
that no longer exists); a challenge against a genus that was small or
well-known; or odd claiming or procedural aspects, such as the combination of process limitations and exhaustive fact findings in the
Hoechst bench trial, that made the genus unusually susceptible to being
upheld.
Notwithstanding these exceptions, we conclude that chemical genus claims do not do well against § 112(a) challenges at the Federal
Circuit, and haven’t for almost thirty years. 384 That is a fundamental

379. Id. at 1335.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1361 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 1359. For a discussion of such claims, see generally Karshtedt, Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions, supra note 152.
383. The most significant Federal Circuit opinion relying on Hoechst to uphold claims
against a written description challenge is Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2005), discussed above. In other cases, such as In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1333–34 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), Hoechst was distinguished.
384. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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reversal of the way the law used to be — and the way many lawyers,
companies, and scholars may assume it still is.

IV. SHOULD WE SAVE GENUS CLAIMS?
A. A Troubling Shift in Precedent
The move to invalidate large genus claims on enablement and written description grounds reflects a puzzling and troubling doctrinal shift.
In this Section, we argue that the Federal Circuit has significantly altered what it means to enable (or describe) the full scope of the claim
in ways that make many genus claims unsustainable. In doing so, it has
conflated different legal theories and justifications for restricting the
scope of genus claims. And it has broken the symmetry that has traditionally existed between obviousness analysis under § 103 and the disclosure rules of § 112.
1. What Does the PHOSITA Know?
Both § 103 (which sets forth the nonobviousness requirement) and
§ 112 rely on standards based on the knowledge and experience of the
person having ordinary skill in the art, or PHOSITA. When we test
whether a patent embodies something nonobvious under § 103, we ask
whether the PHOSITA would’ve been motivated to create the new invention and would’ve had a reasonable expectation of success. 385 And
when we decide how much information the patentee must disclose, we
turn again to the PHOSITA, making sure the patent discloses enough
that the PHOSITA can make and use the invention. 386 The § 103 and
§ 112 PHOSITAs aren’t always exactly the same; they were traditionally imagined as working at different points within the patenting process, and they’re doing somewhat different things (inventing versus
making and using). 387 But in general there is symmetry between obviousness and disclosure that turns on the level of skill in the art. 388 If the
PHOSITA in a field knows a lot, an invention is more likely to be
385. Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1366–69 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
386. See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 41, at 1189–90.
387. For obviousness under § 103, the relevant standard is technically what the PHOSITA
would have known at the time the invention was made. For § 112, the standard has traditionally been what they would have known at the time the application is filed, somewhat after the
date of invention. See id. at 1190. But that changed with the America Invents Act. For patent
applications filed on or after March 16, 2013, both doctrines ask what the PHOSITA would
know as of the filing date. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3,
125 Stat. 284, 288 (2011).
388. See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 41, at 1190 (discussing this difference); see also Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 978 (2007) (describing the § 112 PHOSITA as “a bit of a plodder”).
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obvious, but that also means that the patent doesn’t need as much detail
to educate and thus enable her. 389 If she knows very little, by contrast,
it’s easier to show nonobviousness (because she was less likely to come
up with it), but she also must be taught more for purposes of enablement.
That symmetry held for decades in the chemical arts. Courts regularly tell us that chemistry is an unpredictable art, so PHOSITAs can’t
know what effects modifications would have. 390 But chemical compounds have a regular and well-understood structure, so courts confronting obviousness challenges have long held, and the Federal Circuit
confirmed in the seminal case of In re Dillon, that variants of a known
chemical may likely be obvious (i.e., prima facie obvious) unless they
embody unexpected results. 391 That principle typically applies whether
the prior art is a single lead chemical, as in Dillon, or a genus. 392 Just
recently, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that rationale in an obviousness
case that involved the motivation to make a claimed invention based on
a known “lead compound.” 393
But a parallel assumption is strikingly absent from the Federal Circuit’s enablement and written description cases over the past three decades. To the contrary, the cases discussed in Part III generally start from
the premise that the chemical arts are unpredictable, but then apply the
opposite of the Dillon-type analysis. They assume that no one could
figure out what works in a genus unless there are “blaze marks” showing which variants on a lead chemical compound will have the same
effects and which ones won’t, or that even if one could figure it out, it
would take too much experimentation. The result for chemical
389. See Seymore, Patenting the Unexplained, supra note 5, at 718 n.85 (“[I]f the
PHOSITA is really smart . . . an applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA already
knows or can easily figure out . . . .” (citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d
1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
390. See Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys, Ltd, 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(noting how chemistry is “often” an unpredictable art); Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding a chemical process for labeling
nucleotides “highly unpredictable” at the time of invention); see also Brenner v. Manson, 383
U.S. 519, 532 (1966) (recognizing the unpredictability of chemical compounds in the steroid
field). See generally Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 12.
391. 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc); see also Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v.
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring) (noting
the validity of subject matter involving unexpected results relative to a known compound was
“not in question” on obviousness grounds). For an analysis of structural similarity and other
issues in obviousness doctrine, see generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Nonobviousness: Before and
After, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1609 (2021).
392. If the genus in the prior art disclosure is extremely large, however, the existence of
that genus does not necessarily motivate one to make a particular species within that genus,
ultimately rendering that species nonobvious. See, e.g., In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 382–83 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (rejecting the proposition that a
disclosure of a chemical genus, however broad, “renders obvious any species that happens to
fall within it”).
393. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 955 F.3d 25, 32 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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patentees is the worst of both worlds — we’ll presume the new species
you claim isn’t patentable because the PHOSITA could figure out how
to make it if it’s just an obvious structural variant on an existing one,
but we won’t presume that the PHOSITA understands the same thing
when she’s reading your genus claim. The Federal Circuit’s modern
genus claim cases, in other words, have shifted the role of the
PHOSITA in a way that breaks the symmetry between § 103 and
§ 112. 394
2. “Making and Using . . . the Full Scope of the Invention”
There is a second, and more fundamental, shift in the Federal Circuit’s § 112 case law. Using both enablement and written description,
the court has changed the focus of the § 112(a) inquiry from “what information would be required to permit the PHOSITA to make and use
species in the invention” to “what information is required to teach the
PHOSITA which species in the genus work and which ones don’t.” 395
Put another way, thirty years ago § 112(a) was about use and practice
of the invention, while today it’s primarily about understanding the
boundaries of the invention. That shift has profound implications for
large genus claims. It’s frequently impossible to test all or even a “representative number” of species of a genus that may contain millions of
different species. 396 Even a patentee that tests quite a few species may
be unable to predict which species will work and which won’t. The
question is whether that inability should matter, and why.
If the goal is to enable the PHOSITA to make and use the invention,
the inability to predict in advance which species will work doesn’t matter much except at the extremes. For instance, Atlas Powder didn’t
know which of its claimed dynamite compounds would work and
which wouldn’t, but with a 40% failure rate a user would likely only
have to try two or maybe three compounds to find one that would
work. 397 That required some experimentation, but the law has traditionally allowed claims requiring experimentation as long as it is not “undue.” 398 There may be some patents claiming genuses that give so little
information that trying to find a species that works takes too much

394. Cf. Albanese, supra note 113, at 359–60 (recognizing this but suggesting it is a good
thing).
395. These are scare quotes.
396. Indeed, Jeff Lefstin notes that most genus claims are open-ended and so contain a
potentially infinite number of species. Lefstin, supra note 70, at 1168–74.
397. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
398. See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
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effort, but that is likely to be rare in traditional pharmaceutical claims
if the genus is properly specified. 399
More to the point, what’s going on in the cases discussed in Part III
isn’t an assessment of whether the PHOSITA could make the invention
work without undue experimentation. Rather, those cases reflect a new
and different goal for § 112(a) — explaining to the PHOSITA what
subset of the genus claims will work and what subset won’t. The goal
of those cases seems to be knowledge of the precise boundaries of the
genus. That may be desirable in some cases, as we note below. But it
isn’t normally required for the PHOSITA to make and use the invention
without undue experimentation. And it has proven in practice to be an
impossible burden.
3. Recognizing When We Need to Understand What Works . . . and
When We Don’t
We think this move from undue experimentation to a search for a
clear definition of which species work and which don’t misunderstands
the basic purpose of the § 112(a) inquiry. If the patentee defines a clear
genus, so that people will know whether or not the chemicals they make
fall within that genus, the PHOSITA will be able to make and use the
full scope of that genus so long as she can determine how to make
chemicals within the genus and assess whether they work for the intended purpose without having to engage in undue experimentation.
True, she won’t be able to make every species. But why would she want
to? That is not the point of § 112(a). And true, the PHOSITA might
have to experiment to figure out whether the particular species she
made works for the intended purpose, but that is not a problem unless
she has to engage in too much experimentation.
399. There may be more systematic uncertainty in biotechnology, both because we know
less about the field and because the nature of large molecules is different and less predictable
than the small molecules that the pharmaceutical industry traditionally works with. For some
biotechnology inventions, such as antibodies, the invention may be defined only in functional
terms (as binding to a particular epitope of an antigen with a certain specificity), and it may
well require undue experimentation to determine what antibodies fit within the scope of the
claim at all. This was at issue in Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
appeal after remand, 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, 850 Fed. App’x 794 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (nonprecedential). In this Article, we don’t want to get into the particular question of
whether functional claiming of such antibodies is appropriate. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Software
Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 923 [hereinafter Lemley, Functional Claiming] (exploring the problems with functional claiming in the software
context, and noting that in some instances the function a given claim performs “may be simple
or complex, broad or narrow, but . . . [the claim can be drafted to] effectively cover any device
that performs that function in any way”). But functional antibody claims that read on any
antibody binding to a specific epitope on an antigen may fail the traditional enablement requirement if those of skill in the art can’t identify and make antibodies within the scope of the
claims without undue experimentation. But it is that question, not the question of “did you
identify all of them?”, that should resolve cases like Sanofi.
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To be sure, there will be cases where the patent doesn’t give
enough information to allow her to do even that much without undue
experimentation. 400 But that isn’t limited to broad genus claims. The
claims may well be narrow, even directed to one species, but they’re
invalid if the specification fails to give the appropriate instructions —
like concentrations and ratios of reagents or components — such that
the PHOSITA wouldn’t be able to make the invention work at all. This
is the traditional purpose of enablement doctrine. 401
If that isn’t true — if the PHOSITA can figure out how to make a
working embodiment without too much effort — there is no reason to
require more in most cases. Decisions like Wyeth, 402 Idenix, 403 and Boston Scientific, 404 which focus on the number of species covered by the
genus claim as a reason to reject it, miss the point. The genus is very
large and it would take an impossible effort to identify all the species
within its scope that work. But there’s no reason anyone needs to make
that much effort (except that more and more Federal Circuit cases seem
to require it). Anyone who wants to know if their chemical is within the
scope of the claim can readily make that assessment: by hypothesis, the
boundaries of the chemical genus are well-specified, and it doesn’t take
much effort to determine whether or not any particular chemical works
for its intended purpose. 405
In these cases, ironically, having a functional limitation like that
requiring operability or therapeutic efficacy may have hurt the patentee
because it caused the court to focus on operability as an element of the
inventions. 406 Idenix, for instance, holds that there are no “blaze marks”
for structural modifications within the large genus that will achieve the
claimed invention’s purpose. 407 But that shouldn’t matter. A claim to a
new chemical genus is patentable as long as it has a disclosed utility,
whether or not that utility is claimed. 408 And if the PHOSITA would
400. See, e.g., Tyler v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1868); Wood v. Underhill, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 1, 5 (1846); White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d
788, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
401. See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735–36 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
402. Wyeth v. Abbott Lab’ys, 720 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
403. Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
404. Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
405. Kristina Caggiano Kelly and Paul Calvo offer an excellent illustration of this. They
point to an artist named Martin Silfen who uses a combination of just sixteen geometric tiles
to create paintings. Because the tiles can be rotated and can each be used in a different order,
there are 89 sextillion different possible tile combinations. But no one needs to try all or even
very many of those combinations to make the invention work; they just need to know to lay
out sixteen tiles in a 4x4 grid. Kristina Caggiano Kelly & Paul A. Calvo, Insight: The Scope
of a Sextillion — How Courts Misapply Law of Enablement to Life Sciences, BLOOMBERG L.
(May 1, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/insight-the-scope-of-asextillion-how-courts-misapply-law-of-enablement-to-life-sciences [https://perma.cc/APE9KSWX].
406. See Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1386.
407. Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1164.
408. See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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know how to make and use the chemicals within that genus, the claim
is enabled and adequately described under traditional principles. Adding the purpose as a claim limitation narrows rather than broadens the
claim. If the patentee has enabled the broad claim, it doesn’t make sense
to hold that the narrower claim is not enabled even though the
PHOSITA can identify and use some operable species defined by the
narrowing limitations within the broader genus.
The courts that have done so seem to be articulating a concern
about “possession” of a genus in both enablement and written description contexts. Their fear isn’t that the PHOSITA can’t make and use the
invention, but that the patentee can’t actually tell us what exactly is in
the genus. Possession can sometimes matter in patent law. 409 But for
§ 112, it should matter only in two discrete sets of circumstances: when
there is no proper genus at all, or when the patentee hasn’t yet invented
that genus.
a. Improper Generalization
In the first set of cases, the problem is that the patentee has defined
a genus of things that don’t really have anything in common. The genus
may well be small, but some species are not at all like the others given
the purpose or nature of the invention, and just wouldn’t work.
The Incandescent Lamp case, 410 discussed above, 411 is a good example of this sort of possession problem, which we might call improper
generalization. 412 Sawyer and Man, the inventors, had built a working
light bulb filament from carbonized paper and wood carbon, and they
properly claimed those species. 413 When it came time to define the genus, however, they guessed — and ultimately, it turns out, guessed
wrong. While carbonized paper was in fact a species of the broader genus they claimed — “fibrous and textile materials,” which encompassed “fibrous vegetable materials” 414 — there was nothing about that
genus that made it particularly well suited to work as a light bulb filament. 415 Indeed, as the defendant, Thomas Edison, later found, the vegetable fibers in the genus of plants generally interfered with, rather than
promoted, the use of the material as a filament. 416 Sawyer and Man
hadn’t really taught how to make and use the genus claim, not simply
409. Cf. Holbrook, supra note 256, at 146–59 (arguing that possession plays a central role
in this and other patent law doctrines).
410. Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (Incandescent Lamp), 159 U.S. 465
(1895).
411. See supra Section II.A.3.
412. Incandescent Lamp, 159 U.S. at 472.
413. See id.
414. Id. at 465.
415. See id. at 472.
416. Id. at 473.
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because it took a lot of experimentation to identify which plant species
worked, but because the genus was essentially an arbitrary collection
of things. Sawyer and Man might as well have claimed a genus of “filaments beginning with the letter P.” The Corona Cord Tire case, in
which the Supreme Court faulted the patentee for improperly generalizing from a disclosed species, appears to be to the same effect. 417
Improper generalization is not about the overall size of the genus,
or even the number of inoperative embodiments, 418 though if you haven’t identified what the relevant genus is, then there will often be a lot
of examples that don’t work. Rather, the problem is ultimately one of
possession — the patentee didn’t invent a genus because she didn’t actually identify a group of chemicals with a relevant property in common. 419 That should disqualify even a small genus, because the patentee
in reality hasn’t disclosed a genus at all.
Relatedly, the improper generalization rationale can invalidate
claims on truly nascent technologies. Cases like Amgen v. Chugai and
Enzo v. Calgene reflect this principle. 420 Even granting that the patents
at issue in those two cases provided some examples of how to make the
inventions as claimed, the patentee shouldn’t be permitted to lock up
an entire new field of research if these teachings don’t generalize or
generalize solely thanks to luck. 421 Therefore, we believe that the judgments of invalidity in Chugai and Enzo were correct. 422
Conversely, though, a properly defined genus sharing a relevant
structural characteristic shouldn’t be invalidated for improper generalization simply because the group has many members, some of which
may not work. As long as the technology is advanced enough that the
PHOSITA can assess which species work and which ones don’t, she
has the information needed to make and use the invention.

417. Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 385 (1928); see supra
notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
418. In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623, 624–25 (C.C.P.A. 1938), for instance, rejects a genus with
only four species in it because the patentee gave no indication that it thought the invention
was a property of that genus and included no broadening language in the specification.
419. See Brian P. O’Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genus: Developing a New Approach for Analyzing the Sufficiency of Disclosure Within the Unpredictable Arts, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147, 153 (1996).
420. See supra Section III.A.
421. See supra notes 164–170 & 182–188 and accompanying text.
422. See also Pac. Bioscis. of Cal., Inc. v. Oxford Nanopore Techs., Inc., 996 F.3d 1342,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (upholding a finding of no enablement where evidence showed the
PHOSITA wasn’t “able to use nanopore sequencing to sequence biological DNA” until well
after the filing date of the patent application). Indeed, this case can be characterized as one
where the specification has not provided enough information to make the invention at all. See
supra note 400 and accompanying text.
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b. Gun Jumping and Late Claiming
The second set of circumstances in which possession matters for
genus claims relates to the timing of those claims. This is, first and
foremost, the proper province of the written description requirement.
The claim may be narrow and even enabled as to making, but the inventor raced to the USPTO before she actually had the invention figured out (gun jumping), or alternatively wrote an amended claim after
she figured it out but sought to get an earlier priority date for it (late
claiming).
Gun jumping is common in the chemical and biotechnological arts
because the importance of patents leads to a race to be first. And in the
modern world, being first means being first to file an application with
the USPTO. 423 Gun jumping is frequently associated with functional
claiming — identifying a problem and claiming “anything that solves
that problem.” The law disfavors functional claims, and sometimes limits them to the specific examples the patentee has identified. 424 One example is Ariad. 425 In Ariad, the patentee claimed the idea of creating
chemicals to have a particular effect, but couldn’t give any examples of
chemicals that would fit that genus. 426
Notably, the problem with gun jumping isn’t that the claim is too
broad per se, though many functional claims are quite broad. Had Ariad
identified some specific chemicals that inhibited the biological pathway
it discovered, it may well have taught people enough to make and use
a broader genus of those chemicals. Rather, the problem is that the patentee didn’t get there yet, 427 and the law does not want them to discourage further work by those who do actually take the time to find the
solution and not just predict it. 428
423. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
424. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018); see also Lemley, Functional Claiming, supra note 399,
at 916–17 (discussing how courts interpreted the statute to limit claim breadth to “the particular technologies described in the patent specification” because otherwise, a claim could
“cover every means of performing the function”).
425. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
426. Id. at 1357–58; cf. Nuvo Pharms. (Ir.) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’ys
Inc., 923 F.3d 1368, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (striking down the claims under written description for lack of proof of therapeutic efficacy at time of filing); In re ’318 Pat. Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (striking down claims for lack of how-touse enablement, i.e., lack of utility, for similar reasons). How-to-use enablement can be a
problem under Manson even if the utility is not recited as a limitation. See Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 534–36 (1966) (holding that a claim to a process of making a chemical was
invalid for lack of utility because the chemical itself lacked utility).
427. See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56
B.C. L. REV. 949 (2015) (framing this problem as a trans-doctrinal issue of “completeness”
of the claimed invention).
428. Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 112, 115–16 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171,
1186–90 (2016).
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Timing can also be a problem in the opposite direction when the
patentee didn’t actually see an aspect of her own invention until after
filing. In the well-known case of Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline
Corp., 429 the patentee came up with an improvement in sofa technology
that allowed two sofa sections side by side to recline. 430 They built a
fixed console to house the controls for the sofa between the recliner
sections. 431 But after seeing that competitors found other places to put
the controls, the patentee sought to retroactively change its patent
claims to cover any location for the controls. 432
A patentee who tries to fix claims in this manner after filing isn’t
entitled to assert that they owned the invention all along. They didn’t
possess the invention they now claim when they filed their patent. The
problem isn’t that the PHOSITA couldn’t make or use the invention; a
reasonable sofa designer could easily imagine a number of places to put
the controls. Rather, the problem is that the patentee didn’t actually
think of the genus they now claim at the time they filed their patent
application.
4. The New Full-Scope Requirement
The enablement cases dealing with improper generalization and
written description cases dealing with gun jumping or unsupported
claiming make sense, and both define a legitimate set of circumstances
when it’s proper to disallow genus claims. But these cases aren’t cabining those claims simply because they are too broad. They are cabining
them because the patentee couldn’t or didn’t actually identify the genus
in a meaningful way at the time it filed its patent application. Unfortunately, courts have expanded those specific circumstances in which a
possession inquiry makes sense into a general requirement that patentees must “possess” the full scope of the invention, by which they seem
to mean “know which species work and which ones don’t.” 433 In effect,
courts have converted the full-scope enablement inquiry from “did I
teach you enough such that you can make use of the full scope of the
invention?” 434 to “did I give you enough information to assess the full
list of what works and what doesn’t without undue experimentation?”
That’s an impossible requirement to meet. And it doesn’t serve the purposes of § 112. It’s asking the wrong question, because it’s confusing
possession of the genus (a written description question) with how
429. 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
430. Id. at 1473.
431. Id. at 1475.
432. Id. at 1475–77.
433. For a discussion of enablement as possession, see Holbrook, supra note 256, at 146–
61.
434. This formulation allows for some inoperative species, à la Atlas Powder, as long as
the PHOSITA can determine whether a particular species works without too much effort.
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people can use what you taught them (an enablement question). An inventor can develop a new genus without pre-identifying every species
in that genus.
This category error is at the heart of the demise of genus claims in
the biotechnological, chemical, and pharmaceutical arts today. And it’s
not something patentees can simply draft around. A chemical genus
with any decently large number of species will never satisfy the Idenix
standard. The claims might be in danger of failing enablement because
the testing will take time, but that’s not even the worst of the inventor’s
problems. No matter how much testing the patentee does, there will
always be untested species, and because those species aren’t tested, the
PHOSITA won’t know whether they are properly included in the genus,
so the claim would fail written description. 435 That didn’t matter under
courts’ old doctrinal view of the world; all the law cared about was
whether the PHOSITA could make a species and figure out whether it
worked. But the new version of the full-scope enablement requirement
is fatal to genus claims. 436
B. Can Pharmaceutical Patent Owners Survive Without Genus
Claims?
Patent protection is understood to be important in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, perhaps more than anywhere else.
Certainly, the industries themselves seem to think so. Policy disputes
in courts and Congress over the past two decades have time and again
seen the chemical and biomedical industries advocating for strong protection, with the software and Internet industries on the opposite side. 437
As Dan Burk and Mark Lemley explain, those policy differences reflect
very real disparities in how various industries use and experience the
435. This is a particular problem when the claims include a functionality limitation. But as
we saw in Part III, the Federal Circuit is now requiring the identification of all the working
species in a genus even when the claims do not include such a limitation. See supra Sections III.A.2 & III.B.2.b.
436. This new full-scope doctrine has been exported to United Kingdom law. See Regeneron Pharms. Inc. v. Kymab Ltd. [2020] UKSC 27 [56] (holding that “[e]nablement across
the scope of a product claim is not established merely by showing that all products within the
relevant range will . . . deliver the same general benefit” despite the fact that the patentee had
disclosed some embodiments). But cf. Illumina Cambridge Ltd. v. Latvia MGI Tech SIA
[2021] EWHC (Pat) 57 [276]–[279] (Eng.) (limiting the Regeneron sufficiency doctrine to
some degree). More recently, an English decision moved even further away from the U.S.
approach and moved closer to the framework proposed in this Article. See supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
437. See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) [hereinafter BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS]; WENDY H.
SCHACHT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33367, PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL AND
SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES (2006); see also JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43264,
TAILORING THE PATENT SYSTEM FOR SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES (2015) (discussing the merits and
feasibility of implementing sector-specific patenting parameters in the patent system).
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patent system. 438 Patents really are more important to the chemical and
biomedical industries than to others. 439 Further, the patent system
seems to function more like it was designed to in the chemical industries. The scope of claims is clearer, independent invention is rarer,
“stacking” of multiple patents is less common, 440 and the slower pace
of change means that a company thinking of making a product could
search for and find the relevant patents, something that is not true in
many other industries. 441 Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer go so far as to
suggest that the patent system may work well only in the pharmaceutical industry. 442
Given the importance of strong patent protection in these industries, the unwillingness of courts to permit chemical genus claims
seems quite troubling as a policy as well as a doctrinal matter. And yet
these industries seem to be doing just fine. Pharmaceutical patent owners are making record revenues, up more than 800% from 1992 to
2017. 443 They are still obtaining patents in record numbers. 444 They
continue to enforce patents in court; the number of pharmaceutical patent suits filed has remained steady and even increased as patent suits
overall have dropped in the last few years. 445 They are suing on larger
and larger patent portfolios. 446 And finally, when pharmaceutical patent

438. BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 437, Part II, Ch. 5; see also Burk &
Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 271, at 1615 (“The range of patent theories parallels the
range of ways in which the patent system affects companies in different industries.”).
439. See BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 437, at 50; BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 25, at 18.
440. But cf. Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIS. 590,
602 (2018).
441. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 89–93 (discussing the qualities of the pharmaceutical industry that make it amenable to the patent system).
442. Id.
443. Michael A. Carrier, Mark A. Lemley & Shawn P. Miller, Playing Both Sides?
Branded Sales, Generic Drugs, and Antitrust Policy, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 307, 316–17 (2019).
True, other industries may have a greater profit margin, but the fact that pharmaceutical companies keep increasing revenues and investing more and more in developing drugs suggests
they see it as a profitable business.
444. I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTING IS EXTENDING MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES (2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0055d-0036-155042.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ54-QW7T]; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many
Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University
Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 316–17 (2010) (analyzing the increase in the number of patents per drug from 1985 to 2005).
445. See Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Filings Have Risen Significantly Since 2014,
According to Lex Machina’s 2015 Hatch-Waxman/ANDA Report (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://lexmachina.com/media/press/pharmaceutical-patent-litigation-filings-risen-since2014/ [https://perma.cc/6BWT-WU2F].
446. See Ouellette, supra note 444; see also C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug
Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 SCIENCE 1386, 1386 (2013) (discussing the rise of secondary patents).
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owners do take chemical patents to court, they win more often and their
patents are less likely to be invalidated than those in any other field. 447
What is going on? Why does innovation and even patent litigation
seem to be proceeding apace in the pharmaceutical industry when the
very genus claims that are supposed to be so critical are being struck
down left and right? We see two possible answers.
First, it may be that the pharmaceutical industry simply hasn’t internalized the sea change we describe here. After all, they are patenting
and litigating (and innovating) as if the law remained the way it was
thirty years ago.
The reader should be skeptical of this claim. It is worth reiterating
exactly what it entails: in a critical sector of the economy — the one in
which patents matter the most — dozens of appellate decisions have
fundamentally rewritten the law in ways that threaten to undermine its
very purpose . . . and no one really noticed! 448 That’s surprising, if true.
These industries care immensely about patents. Not only do they say
they care a lot, but they also invest heavily in obtaining patents, in filing
and fighting patent lawsuits, and in lobbying Congress to change the
law in their favor. 449 And some of the cases we describe here have billions of dollars at stake. One would think lawyers and clients would
have ample incentive to keep up with the intricacies of the law and,
having done so, would notice the fundamental shift we describe.
For just that reason, we ourselves were skeptical that nobody has
noticed the sea change in Federal Circuit case law. Indeed, in an earlier
draft of this Article we dismissed that possibility out of hand. But we’ve
received a surprising number of comments from both lawyers and
scholars along the lines of “but that can’t be true, what about case X,
where the patent owner won with a genus claim?” In every such case
we examined, however, the patent owner won because the defendant
didn’t raise enablement or written description arguments based on
claim overbreadth. 450 This observation suggests two things. First,
447. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1097–99 (2015). Note that those numbers conceal significant variation by industry. Pharmaceutical patents do very well but biotechnology industry patents do
quite poorly, which (as we explain in this Section) may be because biotechnology plaintiffs
have to rely more frequently on genus claims in brand-brand litigation.
448. This covert rewriting of patent law evokes the theories of “acoustic separation” and
“selective transmission” that Meir Dan-Cohen proposes while analyzing the relationship between conduct rules and decision rules in criminal law. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625 (1984).
449. The United States’ largest companies spent an average of $3.3 billion on intellectual
property litigation, about $1.5 million per matter, in 2019. MORRISON & FOERSTER,
BENCHMARKING IP LITIGATION 2019 2 (2019), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/
benchmarking-ip-litigation-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2QA-TVUL]. Congress’s attempts
to update the patent system in 2005 became an arduous seven-year saga culminating in enactment of the America Invents Act in 2011. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative
History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. BAR J. 435 (2011).
450. See, e.g., Immunex Corp. v. Sandoz Inc., 964 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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patentees are in fact winning cases because defendants don’t realize
they have a powerful new tool to challenge those patents. Second, both
lawyers and scholars are buying into the conventional understanding of
Federal Circuit law. So we can’t discount the possibility that knowledge
of legal change diffuses slowly, and that many key players simply haven’t yet realized how different modern Federal Circuit precedent is.
That’s surprising, if true. It’s also troubling, because it suggests that
innovation might suffer as genus claim owners gradually realize they
are playing a losing game.
If ignorance of the law is not the explanation, the alternative is perhaps even more striking. Maybe the substance of patent doctrine
doesn’t matter that much to innovation, even in the very industry in
which it’s supposed to matter most. One of us has previously documented the “surprising resilience” of the patent economy. 451 Lemley
argues that the patent system as a whole has kept operating pretty much
in the way it always has, regardless of changes in the law that either
strengthen or weaken patent protection. 452 He speculates that the real
value companies find in patents may have little or nothing to do with
the ability to successfully enforce those patents in court, so changes in
legal doctrine that affect whether courts ultimately find patents valid
and infringed simply may not matter very much in practice. 453 Perhaps
pharmaceutical genus claims are just another example of the resilience
of the patent system.
One reason to think that might be true with genus claims is that the
cases we have discussed almost all involve infringement suits rather
than an inventor’s challenge to the USPTO’s refusal to grant a patent.
That’s not an accident. The USPTO does notoriously little examination
or rejection based on enablement and written description. 454 This
means that the Federal Circuit’s changes in the law don’t stop companies from getting patents; they just leave many of those patents more
vulnerable to invalidation if they ever get to court. And getting to court

451. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Lemley, Surprising Resilience].
452. Id.
453. Id. at 40–42 (discussing other benefits of patents, from marketing value to facilitating
transactions to the exclusionary power of even unsuccessful lawsuits).
454. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description
Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2010) (internal quotations omitted) (concluding it is indeed “exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs its case
on written description”); see also Janet Freilich, Ignoring Information Quality, 89 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2113, 2126–29 (2021) (noting the USPTO’s difficulties with enforcing § 112(a)). But
cf. Greg Reilly, The Complicated Relationship of Patent Examination and Invalidation, 69
AM. U. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2020) (arguing that “stretching” of claim scope in infringement
cases can contribute to the disconnect between prosecution and litigation). For further analysis
of the disconnect between prosecution and litigation, see generally Greg Reilly, Decoupling
Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551 (2017).
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can take more than a decade. 455 If you just care about having a patent
for its own sake — for vanity, to trade with others, to lure venture investment, to structure licensing deals for your underlying technology,
or as an asset when you sell the company — the fact that it may turn
out not to be enforceable down the line simply doesn’t matter very
much. 456
Even those who rely on enforcing patents may not care as much as
we expect. As Lemley explains, much of the value of patent litigation
can come from filing cases, not winning them. 457 That’s especially true
in the pharmaceutical industry, where the brand firm’s mere act of filing a suit against a “generic” competitor, no matter how weak the patent, gets the patent owner an automatic 30-month delay in the generic
entering the market. 458 And brand firms often don’t even need to sue
for infringement until after years of regulatory exclusivity administered
by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has expired. 459 Further,
most patent cases settle, 460 and until recently, pharmaceutical cases in
particular frequently settled with the patent owner paying the generic
company to stay off the market for some period of time. 461 When we
couple that with the fact that, as discussed further below, the species
455. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 236 (1998) (finding the average lag time between patent filing
and dispute resolution is over twelve years).
456. Lemley, Surprising Resilience, supra note 451, at 40–42. There is a robust literature
on non-litigation uses for patents. See generally Hanna Hottenrott, Bronwyn H. Hall & Dirk
Czarnitzki, Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for Financing Constraints on R&D,
25 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 197 (2016); Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde & Alexander Ljungqvist, What Is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the US Patent “Lottery”, 75 J.
FIN. 639 (2020); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137 (2000); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
625 (2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521 (2005).
457. Lemley, Surprising Resilience, supra note 451, at 47.
458. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C), (j)(5)(B)(iii) (2018).
459. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
477, 481–84 (2003).
460. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
237, 273–74 (2006); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding
the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1777 (2014).
461. See generally Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-forDelay, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 249 (2019); William Choi, Bruce Den Uyl & Mat
Hughes, Pay-for-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Lundbeck, Actavis, and Others, 5 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 44 (2014). However, the prevalence of such transactions seems to have abated after the Supreme Court decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S.
136, 158–60 (2013), which held that those agreements can violate antitrust laws. See Feldman
& Misra, supra, at 250–52. But some scholars claim that pay-for-delay has simply “found
better ways to camouflage itself.” Id. at 253. Indeed, a surprising number of settlements still
involve concealed payments. See King Drug Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d
388, 404 (3d Cir. 2015) (“It seems to us that no-AG agreements are likely to present the same
types of problems as reverse payments of cash.”); Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert
Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 18 (2013).
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claim may be enough to prevent generic entry, the loss of genus claims
may not matter all that much in pharmaceutical and biotechnology
cases against generic and biosimilar firms.
Indeed, in significant swaths of the pharmaceutical industry, the
species claim may be more important than the genus claim because of
regulatory exclusivities and the FDA’s requirements for generics. The
pharmaceutical patent owner may claim a genus, but it sells a specific
chemical. That’s what gets FDA approval, and that’s what is entitled to
regulatory exclusivity. 462 If a competitor wants to make a different
chemical than the one the patentee does, it generally has to go through
the same expensive, time-consuming New Drug Application (“NDA”)
process the patentee did. 463 To take advantage of the cheaper, faster
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) process, generic companies that file with the FDA basically need to copy the patentee’s specific drug, and can’t substitute a different species within the same
genus. That is even more true if they hope to take advantage of state
generic substitution laws that allow pharmacists to fill brand name drug
prescriptions with cheaper generics. 464 The generic drug must generally
be identical (or “AB-rated”) to the one prescribed. 465
In sum, for the most important class of pharmaceutical patent
cases — litigation against generics — it’s the patent on the specific
chemical actually sold, and not the genus claim, that’s critical. 466 That
may explain an otherwise-curious feature of enablement and written
description cases: even though most pharmaceutical company litigation
is against generics, almost all of the § 112(a) cases involving genus
claims are against competing brand companies. It is only in those less
common competitor cases in which genus claims really matter. Still,
that doesn’t mean there is no problem with eliminating genus claims.
Enforcing genus claims may drive certain classes of innovation, pushing pharmaceutical research away from “me-too” drugs towards new
462. Regulatory exclusivity gives the first company to submit a new drug for approval a
period of time during which no one can use its data or tests to get a generic equivalent drug
approved. Those exclusivity periods are independent of patent rights. See Eisenberg, supra
note 459, at 483; John R. Thomas, The End of “Patent Medicines”? Thoughts on the Rise of
Regulatory Exclusivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39, 42–43, 42 n.40 (2015).
463. The § 505(b)(2) “paper NDA” route provides something of an exception. See generally Jonathan J. Darrow, Mengdong He & Kristina Stefanini¸ The 505(b)(2) Drug Approval
Pathway, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403 (2019).
464. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1151 (2019).
465. Id.
466. At least, that is true for the drug’s active ingredient, which must generally be identical
to the marketed one. Generic companies have more ability to vary formulations of excipients,
so genus claims may be more important in ANDA litigation over such secondary patents. See
S. Sean Tu & Mark A. Lemley, What Litigators Can Teach the Patent Office About Pharmaceutical Patents 22–23 (W. Va. Univ. Coll. L., Research Paper No. 2021-015, 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3903513 [https://perma.cc/KK42-2P55] (finding that the overwhelming majority of patent suits triggered by ANDA filings involved secondary patents).
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classes of treatments. 467 Nonetheless, the fact that run-of-the-mill pharmaceutical cases involve species, not genus, claims may help explain
why the sky hasn’t fallen on the pharmaceutical industry even as those
genus claims fail.
Large-molecule life science and biotechnology fields — which
produce so-called “biologic” drugs — are in a similar, though not identical, position. Until quite recently there was no FDA approval process
for “biosimilars” — the rough biotechnology equivalent of generic substitutes. 468 As a result, anyone who wanted to make a variant or even a
copy of the patentee’s species had to go through the same FDA approval process the patentee did. There is now, however, the rough
equivalent of an ANDA for biosimilars, and it has a key characteristic
that renders it comparable to the ANDA process: the biosimilar needs
to make a fairly close copy of the actual species that was approved, not
just some chemical in the broader genus. Indeed, getting biosimilars to
market is significantly harder than doing so with generic pharmaceuticals. This is both because Congress extended data exclusivity from five
years in the case of pharmaceuticals to twelve years for biologic drugs,
meaning that the biosimilar (or bioequivalent) product can’t get approved until much later, 469 and because copying biotechnological materials turns out to be much tougher and less certain than copying smallmolecule chemicals. 470
As a result, genus claims may not actually be needed to prevent
copying by generics in either the pharmaceutical or biologics industries, but only to stop competing branded drug companies from producing their own new chemical or biologic products. And while restricting
that competition can be important to pharmaceutical companies, these
companies may already have enough incentive to invent based on the
regulatory exclusivities and the barriers to entry competitors will
face — even if the weakness of genus claims ultimately leads to competition from other branded firms filing their own NDAs. That competitors can’t cheaply or quickly enter the market with a different species,
but must go through their own FDA approval process, can discourage
competitive entry and give the patent owners substantial time to recoup

467. On “me-too” drugs, see generally Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property
I: Harmonized Measurement of New and Follow-On Drug Approvals, Patents and Chemical
Components, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 38, 61 (2012); Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K.
Choudhry, How Many “Me-Too” Drugs Is Too Many?, 305 JAMA 711, 711–12 (2011).
468. See Karshtedt, Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions, supra note 152, at 136.
469. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018).
470. See Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 338 n.155
(2015); W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1032–33, 1049 (2016).
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their expenses. 471 Patent owners may also buy potential competitors in
order to blunt the effect of some of this competition. 472
The pharmaceutical industry is the poster child for strong patent
protection. But if it turns out the industry does just fine with narrow
patent protection coupled with regulatory limits on copying, without
the need for patents that prevent companies from marketing their own
competing drugs that aren’t basically identical to the patentee’s, a major
part of the case for expansive patent protection disappears. We’re not
persuaded that is true, and genus claims still seem important to us. But
the fact that the sky hasn’t fallen on the pharmaceutical industry even
though genus claims have been systematically invalidated should give
us pause, requiring further inquiry into how much patent protection really is necessary.
Nonetheless, even though a major change in pharmaceutical patent
law doesn’t seem to have affected industry behavior, that doesn’t mean
we should ignore legal doctrine. But it may be healthy to temper our
disputes over legal doctrine with a recognition that law in action may
diverge substantially from the law on the books. 473 The story of genus
claims is a remarkable example of how a sophisticated industry and its
lawyers keep operating as if the law still works the way it once did (and
the way they would like it to).
C. Implications for Other Industries
None of the highly rigorous regulatory structure discussed above
exists for non-medical chemistry. A solvent, a new petroleum blend, or
an agricultural biotechnology invention doesn’t get regulatory exclusivities or face generic substitution laws. 474 Early competitive entry
may thus be more likely in those industries in the absence of effective
genus claims. So we shouldn’t be completely sanguine about the continued success of the chemical industries outside the pharmaceutical
arena despite the invalidity of genus claims. The change in the law may
still have significant effects in those industries, 475 as well as in competitor cases in the life sciences.
471. See BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 437, at 132–34 (discussing the relative costs of innovating relative to copying as a policy consideration in intellectual property).
472. See Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping
Industry Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1217–21 (2019) (documenting consolidation in
the pharmaceutical industry and linking it to the need to acquire valuable patents).
473. See generally Dan-Cohen, supra note 448.
474. To be sure, pesticide registration under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act includes provisions for generic entry that are somewhat similar to the ANDA
process for pharmaceutical drugs. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(3)(B) (2018).
475. For an example of a failure of purely structural chemical claims from the pesticide
industry, see Syngenta Crop Protection AG v. FMC Corp., No. PGR2020-00028, 2020 WL
5539136, at *12–14 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 15, 2020) (granting institution of a post-grant review of
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Further, the rules the Federal Circuit is applying to genus claims
may reverberate beyond chemistry altogether. While Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley argue that the Federal Circuit applies different § 112
rules to the life sciences than it does elsewhere, 476 the court denies doing so, taking the position that its doctrines apply across the board.477
Traditionally we’ve not seen strict application of the § 112 doctrines to
either the mechanical arts or to the IT industry, 478 perhaps because of
the court’s intonation that those arts are “predictable.” 479 Indeed, the
absence of effective enablement and written description doctrines in
software cases has led to functional claiming — patent claims that target the problem to be solved and cover any solution to that problem. 480
But that’s changing. The Federal Circuit’s insistence on applying
doctrines like written description across all technology areas has led it
to invalidate software and hardware claims for lack of written description. 481 And the court has sometimes applied the idea of full-scope enablement to invalidate genus claims outside chemistry, even where

a pesticide genus patent on § 112(a) enablement grounds in view of Idenix), further proceedings, Paper 33, at 51 (P.T.A.B Aug. 31, 2021) (invalidating the claims at issue under Idenix
in a final written decision).
476. See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 41, at 1156; Burk & Lemley,
Policy Levers, supra note 271, at 1652–54.
477. See Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting the
notion of a separate, and more lenient, written description rule for antibodies and recognizing
that the court has “generally eschewed judicial exceptions to the written description requirement based on the subject matter of the claims.” (citing Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 358 F.3d 916, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same).
478. BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 437, at 59–62.
479. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing predictable technologies);
Collins, supra note 361, at 1088, 1114, 1121 (discussing the enablement requirement as applied to software inventions). In the early days of computer programming, courts considered
the act of translating thoughts into code “a mere clerical function to a skilled programmer.”
In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817 & n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding disclosure of “menial”
tools used in programming unnecessary). More recently, however, this view shifted in favor
of more disclosure. See, e.g., Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part) (holding that even if “one of skill in the art could program
a computer to perform the recited functions[, that] cannot create structure where none otherwise is disclosed”); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (finding “describing one embodiment of the thing” was not sufficient to provide
adequate § 112(a) support for the claimed software invention).
480. Lemley, Functional Claiming, supra note 399, at 905; see Otis Elevator Co. v. Pac.
Fin. Corp., 68 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir.), supplemented on reh’g, 71 F.2d 641, 641–42 (9th Cir.
1934).
481. See, e.g., Taylor v. Iancu, 809 Fed. App’x 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential)
(holding claims for a GPS information system invalid for lack of written description);
Realtime Data, LLC v. Morgan Stanley, 554 Fed. App’x 923, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential) (holding claims relating to data transmission and encryption systems invalid for lack
of written description). While these are not treated as genus claim cases in the way that pharmaceutical cases are, the use of the written description requirement to invalidate software
claims is still notable.
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those genuses are quite small. 482 A number of commentators have noted
the conflict between single-embodiment and full-scope enablement in
non-pharmaceutical cases. 483 We may see more such cases in the future.
Restricting broad claims in fields like IT may be less troubling than
in the chemical arts, however. After all, abundant evidence suggests
that broad patent protection is less important in IT than in other industries. 484 And laxness in enforcing § 112 in those industries has led to
endemic problems with overbroad patents not tied to any particular
technology. 485 At the same time, however, the full-scope enablement
idea seems troubling in many areas of technology. As Jeff Lefstin reminds us, almost all patent claims are directed to an indefinitely large
genus in some sense because they incorporate various concepts that
could be implemented in multiple ways, and because a defendant who
uses the claimed elements does not avoid infringement by adding new
elements. 486 Too strict a focus on the full scope of the claim rather than
what the PHOSITA could figure out could in theory doom most patent
claims in a variety of fields.

V. CONCLUSION
The story of genus claims is a story of the disconnect between the
past and the present, between perception and reality, and between theory and practice. Patent law has always venerated the genus claim. Patent lawyers and patent owners still do. But courts have changed their
thinking — and changed the law — to such a dramatic extent that patent owners who sue on genus claims almost always lose at the Federal
Circuit. And yet life continues much as it did before. In part, that reflects the fact that perhaps people haven’t recognized the size or importance of the change in the law. But it may also indicate that the law
itself matters less than we think, even for companies that seem to depend on patent law for their livelihoods.
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485. See Lemley, Functional Claiming, supra note 399, at 908–09, 948.
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